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Abstract 
Using a novel dataset, we study intraday trades of overnight general collateral repurchase 
agreements (repos) on Italian government bonds. We focus both on repos cleared by central 
counterparties (CCPs) and traded bilaterally. Intraday bond supply, liquidity and duration 
significantly affect the spread of repo rates over the European Central Bank (ECB) deposit rate, but 
after the ECB quantitative easing interventions this impact is much reduced. During the European 
sovereign debt crisis, the increase in margins further deteriorates repo costs, creating a negative 
procyclical effect. Once we control for the impact of margin costs, CCP-based repos do not appear 
to be significantly cheaper than bilateral repos. We also show that bonds with lower liquidity and 
specialness, greater supply and longer duration are more likely to be selected as collateral. 
However, during the crisis, CCP-repo borrowers choose collateral bonds with higher liquidity and 
lower duration to reduce margin and repo trading costs. 
JEL classification: E43; E51; G01; G12; G15; G24 
Keywords: Repurchase agreement; Intraday repo rate; Bond collateral; Funding liquidity; Central 




Overnight (ON) general collateral (GC) repurchase agreements (repos) are the most common 
financial instruments used by banks to raise short-term loans backed by collateral, such as 
government bonds, and to efficiently manage intraday liquidity at lower interest rates than in the 
ON unsecured markets. Before the 2007–2008 financial crisis repos were largely ignored, until a 
seizure in the market triggered panic and played a key role in the crisis development. After that 
event and the resulting European sovereign debt crisis (ESDC), the European Central Bank (ECB) 
started a policy of massive bond purchases which has made repo collateral scarcer.1  In addition, 
new regulation has encouraged repo trading to shift to central clearing counterparties (CCPs).  
Given the centrality of the topic, in this paper we study intraday ON GC repos, both cleared by 
CCPs and traded bilaterally, to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms behind this 
market that can inform banks’ intraday borrowing decisions and collateral selection. We address the 
following questions: Does the cost of an ON GC repo change over the day and what is the expected 
pattern? Which factors determine the variation of the intraday ON GC repo cost and do they have a 
different impact during periods of higher and lower market stress and central bank intervention? Is 
there any significant difference between CCP-based and bilaterally-traded repos? How do repo 
borrowers choose which bond to deliver as collateral depending on the type of repo contract (CCP-
based or bilateral) and the market conditions?  
We look at repos traded on MTS (Mercato dei Titoli di Stato) that use Italian government bonds as 
collateral, over the period from January 2010 to November 2015. The MTS repo market is one of 
the largest electronic markets in Europe and the largest for the Italian segment.  
                                                     
1 The International Capital Market Association has warned that the persistent lack of high-quality government bond collateral have 
started undermining repo trading (see discussion in the 17 October 2016 Financial Times’ article: 
https://www.ft.com/content/1b6736cc-9232-11e6-8df8-d3778b55a923 (subscription required; last accessed on 8 May 2019). 
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Regarding the first question on the specific intraday patterns in ON GC repo rates, two alternative 
hypotheses can be entertained based on the liquidity demand of banks. If banks perceive a high risk 
of not meeting their end-of-day liquidity needs or they want to be more cautious, they will try to 
secure a larger amount of funding earlier in the day. This greater demand may lead borrowing banks 
to pay a higher repo rate in the morning than in the afternoon (downward intraday pattern).2 
Alternatively, if banks wait for the end of the day to offset liquidity unbalances via the ON GC repo 
market, then repo rates may be higher in the late afternoon when banks are more time constrained 
(upward intraday pattern). By looking at the intraday repo rate patterns we examine which liquidity 
management strategy prevails. Some existing papers have found evidence of downward intraday 
interest rate patterns in unsecured money markets: Furfine (2001) in the US Fedwire system; 
Bartolini, Gudell, Hilton and Schwarz (2005) in the Fed funds; and Baglioni and Monticini (2008, 
2013) in the Italian e-MID trading platform. Jurgilas and Žikeš (2014) show that in the UK 
unsecured payment system (CHAPS) these patterns strengthened during the global financial crisis. 
With respect to GC repos, Kraenzlin and Nellen (2010) show intraday patterns in the Swiss franc 
ON repo market during the period January 1999-December 2009 and Abbassi, Fecht and Tischer 
(2017) in the German CCP-based repo rate (on Eurex) over the period January 2006 - June 2012.  
Regarding the second question of which additional factors can determine the intraday variation of 
ON GC repo rates, we look at the characteristics of the collateral market. Our hypothesis is that if 
this market becomes riskier (i.e. bonds are on average less safe and less liquid) or more frictional 
(bonds are in lower supply), then intraday repo costs should increase and banks’ intraday liquidity 
management could be badly affected. Abbassi, Fecht and Tischer (2017) show that the intraday repo 
rates are affected by lower liquidity in the repo market and greater funding uncertainty, particularly 
                                                     
2 Also, because of the time value of money, intraday loans taken up in the morning – with longer duration – should require relatively 
higher interest rates (see Van Hoose, 1991; Angelini, 1998; Bech and Garratt, 2003, among others). 
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during crisis periods, but do not control for the characteristics of the treasury collateral market. Our 
sample period covers the ESDC and the recent period of ECB unconventional monetary policy 
interventions, which have affected the liquidity and availability of Italian treasuries. These dramatic 
market conditions provide us with a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between repo 
rates and collateral characteristics because these variables present a wider range of values over the 
period considered.  
The third question offers a direct cost comparison between centrally-cleared and bilaterally-traded 
ON GC repos and a study of how different factors affect the two market segments over different 
periods. This analysis is very important in light of the current debate on the effectiveness of CCPs’ 
risk mitigation at the peak of regional and/or systemic crises and on the procyclical effects of higher 
margin policies.3 The global regulatory move towards derivatives central clearing warrants an 
examination of whether using CCPs (versus bilateral trading) in this specific repo market can 
effectively reduce counterparty risk and related costs at a time when this risk is high. To the best of 
our knowledge, this comparative analysis has never been addressed in previous studies. Boissel, 
Derrien, Ors and Thesmar (2017) show that for the GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) daily ON GC CCP-based repo spreads react to higher country sovereign risk (proxied by 
sovereign credit default swap spreads) at the peak of the ESDC. Their study does not offer a direct 
comparison between CCP and bilaterally-traded repos and disregards any control for the 
characteristics of the treasury collateral market.  
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide a formal analysis of how repo 
borrowers select a particular instrument as collateral in ON GC repos and how their selection 
                                                     
3 In a 2015 article for BIS Quarterly Review, Domanski, Gambacorta and Picillo claims that, while mitigating counterparty credit 
risk, central clearing may give rise to other forms of systemic risk. In particular, the concentration of the risk management of credit 
and liquidity risk in the CCP may affect system-wide market prices and liquidity dynamics in ways that are not yet understood. The 
CCP may buffer the system against relatively small shocks at the risk of potentially amplifying larger ones. 
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criteria change depending on whether they trade in the CCP or bilateral segment, or in 
stressed/normal repo and collateral market conditions.  
We provide several contributions. First, we show that the intraday repo spread, the difference 
between the repo rate for Italian ON GC repos and the daily ECB deposit rate, decreases steadily 
from the first hour of the trading day until market closure. We also show that the steepness of this 
downward pattern is higher during the ESDC. We conclude that the majority of borrowing banks 
behave cautiously and try to secure funding earlier in the day, especially in periods of higher 
funding stress. A less funding-constrained bank may benefit from this by strategically opting for 
accessing the ON GC repos at a lower cost just before the end of its business hours. 
Second, we find that collateral availability and liquidity have a great impact on the Italian ON GC 
intraday repo spread also after controlling for repo net order flows, number of repo trades, repo 
volatility and the excess liquidity supplied by the ECB. The effect of some of these factors changes 
during and after the ESDC period. The collateral and repo factors, as well as the ECB excess 
liquidity, are all statistically-significant determinants during the crisis period. Their absolute impact 
is much reduced during the post-crisis period (i.e. after the ECB long-term refinancing operations 
(LTRO) in February 2012).  We interpret these results as evidence that: i) ON GC repo lenders react 
efficiently to higher risk and frictions in the collateral and repo market by increasing the repo 
spread; and ii) ON GC repo lenders react to major ECB quantitative easing interventions that reduce 
the dependence of the intraday repo rate on the frictions and riskiness of the collateral market.  
Third, we find that only when the CCP-based repos are no longer available the trading activity in 
bilateral repos increases, although bilateral trading on MTS is allowed throughout the day. In 
normal conditions, the CCP-based repo spread is on average lower than the bilateral repo spread, 
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mostly due to CCP mitigation of counterparty credit risk. However, during the ESDC CCP-based 
repos are not significantly cheaper than the bilateral repo: higher margin costs increase the CCP-
based repo spread generating a negative procyclical effect. Since the increased margins signal 
higher counterparty risk, they also affect the bilateral repo spread even if traders do not pay CCP 
margins to trade bilaterally. Higher bank/counterparty credit risk increases the repo costs for both 
the CCP and bilateral segment, particularly during the ESDC. This is a surprising result, given that 
the CCP should reduce the exposure of the repo contract to counterparty credit risk. 
Finally, we find that bonds with lower bid–ask spreads (BASs), lower market supply and higher 
‘specialness’ are less likely to be selected as collateral in ON GC repos. The difference between the 
GC repo rate and the special repo rate of a bond measures the bond specialness.4 Higher specialness 
signals greater market desirability or relatively scarcer supply of the specific collateral bond. 
According to Duffie (1996) model, more liquid bonds and bonds in lower supply are more desirable 
and more likely to be used in special repos. We see in our results that this type of bonds is less 
likely to be used in GC repos. Also, the higher the bond specialness, the cheaper its use in the 
special repo market, so the less likely it is that this bond would be used for GC repos.  
Furthermore, we find a clear unintended impact of CCP margin policies on repo collateral selection. 
In periods of higher margin levels (such as the ESDC) the CCP-based repo borrowers are more 
likely to choose bonds with lower modified duration and higher liquidity, as they have a lower 
margin and help reducing the cost of repo central clearing. During the ESDC, the higher the margin 
to be paid for a specific collateral bond, the lower the probability that that bond is selected as 
collateral for CCP-based repos.  
                                                     
4 While in an ON GC repo the borrower bank can specify the collateral bond after the repo trade is agreed (choosing amongst a 
pre-defined basket of bonds), in an ON special collateral repo the borrower bank must specify a unique bond to be used as 
collateral at the outset of a repo transaction  paying a (generally) lower ‘special’ repo rate. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers an introduction to the ON GC repo market and 
some preliminary statistics. Section 3 illustrates the intraday patterns in repo spreads. Section 4 and 
Section 5 presents respectively the study on the determinants of ON GC intraday repo spreads and 
on bond collateral selection. Section 6 summarises the findings, contributions, and implications of 
the paper.  
2. Overnight general collateral repos: Data selection and descriptive analysis 
A repo is a collateralised loan based on a simultaneous sale and forward agreement to repurchase a 
security at a future maturity date for its original value plus an interest rate for the use of the cash 
(the repo interest rate). The repo borrower borrows cash against a security used as collateral. The 
repo lender lends cash and then collects the repo interest rate. The ‘first leg’ of the ON GC repo 
contract (i.e. the sale of the collateral security) is instantaneously settled at the time of the trade, 
while the collateral is repurchased by the repo borrower on the next business day at around 7:00 
a.m. Central European Time (CET). In GC repo transactions, the collateral can be any security from 
a predefined basket of securities and it is selected by the repo borrower shortly after the trade time. 
The maximum permitted time lag between the trade and the collateral selection is two hours. On the 
MTS, traders can opt for either CCP-based or bilateral ON GC repos. In CCP-based repos, a CCP 
becomes the credit provider for any repo borrower and the credit taker for any repo lender, so the 
contracts are theoretically not hindered by counterparty risk. Central clearance of Italian ON GC 
repos was introduced by the Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia (CC&G), the main Italian CCP, 
on November 2, 2009.5 Since then, CCP-cleared transactions have become an increasing component 
of all ON repo transactions and reached 69% of the whole market by January 2012 and 95% by 
November 2015. In the CCP setting, banks do not know the identity of their counterparties. In 
                                                     




bilateral repos counterparties instead know each other’s identities. ON GC repos can trade from 
7:45 a.m. until 3:30 p.m. (CET) with a maximum cut-off time for the selection of the collateral set 
at 3:45 p.m. 
We analyse all ON GC repo contracts collateralised by all classes of bonds issued by the Italian 
Treasury: fixed coupon bonds (BTPs, Buoni del Tesoro Pluriennali); inflation-linked coupon bonds 
(BTIs, Buoni del Tesoro Pluriennali Indicizzati); treasury bills (BOTs, Buoni Ordinari del Tesoro); 
zero-coupon bonds (CTZs, i.e. Certificati del Tesoro Zero-Coupon); and floating notes (CCTs, 
Certificati di Credito del Tesoro). 
We use the rich intraday MTS Time Series database for bonds and repos. Our sample covers the 
period from January 4, 2010, the first date available for intraday repo trades, until November 30, 
2015. We concentrate on Italian sovereign GC repos because of the size and relevance of this 
market and because of the large number of available observations in MTS. The MTS repo platform 
is the leading market venue for trading GC repo contracts collateralised by Italian treasuries. MTS 
repo data provide intraday information on the transacted repo ‘volumes’ (i.e., the notional value of 
the repo contracts in euros corresponding also to the notional value of their collateral bonds), 
differentiated as borrower-initiated (repo) volumes and lender-initiated (reverse repo) volumes. In 
addition, MTS provide information on the total number of trades for each type of GC repo contract 
(CCP-based or bilateral) and for each bond used as collateral (identified by its unique ISIN code). 
For each business day, we collect all intraday ON GC Italian repo rates.6 We observe in total 77,467 
intraday trades. The MTS bond data we use contain all intraday updates to the best three bid-quote 
and ask-quote levels (both prices and sizes). Moreover, for each collateral bond we have intraday 
                                                     
6 We discard only two repos out of about 253,496. These repos correspond to a bond that is not traded in the MTS secondary bond 
market during the sample period.  
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prices and yields, intraday modified duration,7 and intraday trades. Other information about the 
specific characteristics of the instruments – e.g. issuance date, maturity date, coupon payment 
schedule etc. – are provided by MTS in separate bond reference files. Using the bonds’ ISIN 
numbers, we match the repo market information with the bond market information. MTS does not 
provide trader identifications, for this reason we can only use information at the aggregate (market) 
level. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that during our sample period the total volume and the daily average 
volume of all ON Italian repo transactions executed on MTS are €9 trillion and €6 billion, 
respectively. Panel B of Table 1 shows that all bonds traded on MTS during the sample period are 
used at least once as collateral in ON GC repos. 335 different bonds are used as collateral for CCP-
based repo contracts and 328 bonds for bilateral repos. Most of these bonds are short-term (179 out 
of 335), issued with one year or less to maturity (BOTs). The remaining collateral bonds are long-
term bonds, mostly BTPs (99) with maturities ranging from 3 to 30 years.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In Figure 1, Panel A we plot the daily volume-weighted average of the intraday repo rates for both 
CCP and bilateral repos, versus the daily ECB deposit and lending rates. In mid-2010, when the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis becomes more acute, the Italian ON GC repo rate increases up to 75 
basis points (bps) above the ECB deposit rate. In the summer of 2011, when the sovereign debt 
crisis spreads to Italy and Spain the repo rate reaches a peak at 150 bps above the ECB deposit rate. 
In the first half of 2014, in a context of falling inflation and a downward revision of the growth 
                                                     
7 In the original MTS dataset there are several missing observations for the modified duration. We have computed the modified 
durations for all the bonds with missing information. 
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forecasts (see Dunne, Everett and Stuart, 2015), the GC repo rate increases again, up to 60 bps over 
the ECB deposit rate.  
Figure 1, Panel B shows that the daily volumes of CCP-based ON GC repos are stable, ranging 
from €4.03 billion in January 2010 to €4.15 billion in November 2015, while the volumes of 
bilateral ON GC repos progressively decrease from €1.78 billion in January 2010 to €0.22 billion in 
November 2015. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Next, we define intraday repo spread as the difference between the Italian ON GC repo rate for an 
intraday transaction on day t and the daily interest rate set by the ECB for depositing liquidity at its 
facility on the same day t. We measure the intraday repo spread each time a repo trade is executed 
on MTS. This spread measures the additional cost of the GC repo over the risk-free ECB deposit 
rate.8 The theoretical motivation for this intraday repo spread is further explained in Section 4. 
Following Baglioni and Monticini (2008), Kraenzlin and Nellen (2010) and Abbassi et al. (2017) 
we obtain a measure of hourly repo spread. Each day is divided into eight hourly time bands, 
denoted by h = 1, 2, …, 8. The first band starts at 8:00 a.m. CET and the last at 3:00 p.m. CET.9 Let 
us define k as the counter of all transactions, during hour h on day t, with kh,t = 1,…, Kh,t. The hourly 
repo spread is computed as the volume-weighted average of intraday repo spreads for all Kh,t repo 
contracts traded during the corresponding hourly band h on day t:  
𝐺𝐶 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑ℎ,𝑡 = ∑





                      (1) 
                                                     
8 Given the virtually-zero default probability of the ECB, the ECB deposit rate could be considered as the best approximation of a 
Euro area risk-free rate.  
9 We discard few trades before 8:00 a.m. and after 3:30 p.m. due to the limited number of observations available to obtain a 
meaningful hourly average for the intraday repo spread. 
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For each hour h, we also create the repo spread for only CCP-based ON GC repos and the repo 
spread for only bilateral ON GC repos.  
Table 2, Panel A shows some statistics on the number of repo trades used to construct these 
measures. The median values are nine CCP-based repo trades per hour and two bilateral repo trades 
per hour. The minimum value is one trade per hour. In Panel B, the number of repo trades is split by 
hourly-band. The number of CCP-based repo trades reaches its peak from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. 
(15 trades per hour on average). The average number of trades in the bilateral segment ranges from 
2.46 to 2.95 trades per hour in the afternoon, and from 1.41 to 1.98 in the morning hours. This 
preliminary evidence clearly shows that when building our measure of intraday repo spread we 
cannot take an interval smaller than one hour because at certain times of the day we have only one 
observation in a specific hourly-band. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Figure 2 shows the total repo volumes (in billions of euros) traded in the two segments in each hour. 
Although bilateral repos can trade from 7:45 a.m. until 3:30 p.m. (CET), they are not frequently 
traded in the morning, while their trading activity is higher from 12:00 p.m. onwards.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Table 3 (Panels A, B and C) shows summary statistics for the hourly repo spreads for CCP and 
bilateral repos. The total number of hourly repo spread observations is 10,604. CCP-based repos 
have the largest number of observations (5,980), while bilateral repos have 4,624 observations. 
Table 3, Panel A, shows that the CCP-based repo has an average hourly repo spread of 16.936 bps, 
almost 3 bps lower than the average hourly repo spread for bilateral repos. The hourly repo spread 
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for CCP-based repos has a smaller standard deviation (20.053 bps) than the bilateral repo spread 
(23.400 bps). The proportion of observations with an hourly repo spread greater than 25 bps (see 
Table 3, Panel B) is 18.83% for CCP-based repos and 25.26% for bilateral repos, respectively.10  
Table 3, Panel C shows average repo spreads by hourly band for CCP-based and bilateral repos 
over the ESDC period and the post-crisis period separately. We learn several interesting features 
from this table.  First, we observe an intraday downward pattern (from 9:00 a.m. onwards) in the 
repo spread over the full sample period for both CCP-based repos and bilateral repos, although for 
the latter only over the more intense afternoon trading session. While the downward pattern is 
visible over the ESDC subsample, there is a less clear intraday pattern over the post-crisis 
subsample. This may reflect a more cautious and risk-averse intraday liquidity management strategy 
of banks during the crisis period.  Second, we observe that the repo spreads for each hourly band are 
on average much higher during the ESDC period for both CCP-based and bilateral repos. This 
finding highlights the need to consider other factors driving the hourly repo spread, in addition to 
the time value of money and to the intraday liquidity management needs of banks. We hypothesise 
that the collateral’s characteristics may have a great deal of impact to determine higher repo spreads 
during the peak of the crisis period. Third, when considering the full sample period, CCP-based 
repos appears always cheaper than bilateral repos for each hourly band (until the CCP-based repo 
trading ends) and their difference is also statistically significant. However, during the ESDC 
subsample CCP-based repos are no longer cheaper then bilateral repos. This preliminary evidence 
seems to cast doubts on the effectiveness of the CCP in mitigating counterparty risk during crisis 
periods. In the empirical analysis we test the impact of margin costs and banks/counterparties credit 
                                                     
10 Extremely high values of intraday repo spreads are the result of high repo rates on particular trading days during the peak of the 
ESDC. Moreover, on specific days, dealers are willing to pay high repo rates in order to have access to funds that are scarce in the 
market, for instance when they are required to cover their regulatory liquidity needs at the end of the month or at the end of the 
reserve maintenance period.  
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risk on repo spreads, after controlling for the hourly trading patterns and the collateral 
characteristics.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The evidence reported in this section suggests that it is important to analyse repo spreads at the 
intraday level, separately for the CCP and bilateral segments, as well as for the ESDC and post-
crisis periods. It also suggests the need to look at a wider set of impact factors that may explain why 
both CCP-based and bilateral repo costs have substantially increased over the ESDC period. 
3. Intraday patterns in repo spreads  
We start the econometric analysis by testing whether the intraday downward sloping pattern in the 
Italian ON GC repo spread observed in Section 2 is statistically significant.  
We estimate the following model:  
𝐺𝐶 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝛼ℎ𝑥ℎ,𝑡
7
ℎ=1 +  𝜆′𝑋𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾′ℎ𝑋𝑡𝑥ℎ,𝑡
7
ℎ=1 +𝜕 𝐶𝐶𝑃ℎ,𝑡 + 𝜖ℎ,𝑡 (2) 
where: 𝑐 denotes the fifth hourly band 12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m. (constant term); h refers to seven 
different hourly bands (excluding the hourly band 12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m.) on day t; 𝑥ℎ,𝑡 is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the repo contract is traded during the hourly band h, and zero 
otherwise; 𝛼ℎ reflects the difference between the average repo spread at 12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m. and 
the average repo spread in the time band h; and 𝜖 is the i.i.d error term. 𝑋𝑡 is a vector of dummy 
variables for seasonal effects (used also by Jurgilas and Žikeš, 2014; and Abbassi et al., 2017): end 
of reserve maintenance period, end of month, end of year, and day-of-the-week effects. By 
including 𝜆′𝑋𝑡  in the equation, we allow the constant of the regression to vary with the seasonal 
13 
 
effects. We also interact 𝑋𝑡 with the hourly dummies 𝑥ℎ,𝑡. Finally, we also use a dummy 𝐶𝐶𝑃, 
which is equal to one when the average hourly repo spread refers to CCP-based repos, and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient 𝜕 captures the marginal difference between the average hourly spread of 
CCP-based repos and bilateral repos. We expect 𝜕 to be negative due to the reduction of 
counterparty credit risk by the CCP. 
We first estimate model (2) for both CCP-based and bilateral repo contracts. Then we re-estimate it 
separately for CCP-based and bilateral repos (thereby dropping the CCP dummy). The results are 
reported in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
For the sample of all repos (first column), we find that the hourly dummies are almost all significant 
at the 1% level, with decreasingly positive coefficients in the morning hours (from 9:00 a.m. to 
12:00 p.m.) and increasingly negative coefficients in the afternoon hours (from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 
p.m.). Therefore, we observe a statistically significant downward sloping pattern in the intraday 
repo spread over the trading day, due to the incentive for banks to ensure funding liquidity at the 
beginning of the day (Angelini, 1998; Van Hoose, 1991) and to reduce the repo rate uncertainty. 
The repo spread increases slightly in the last hour, from 3:00 pm to 4:00 p.m. This is most probably 
due to the higher cost of immediacy during the last hour, after most trades have been already 
concluded.11 In Table 4 (first column) the coefficient of the CCP dummy is negative and highly 
significant, as expected.  
                                                     
11 This explanation is supported by anecdotal evidence and discussion with an MTS repo trading expert. 
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For the sample of CCP-based repos, we can only estimate the hourly dummies until the fifth hour of 
the trading day (12:00 pm – 1:00 p.m.), as this corresponds to the last hour of CCP-based repo 
trading on MTS. The repo spread peaks in the second hour of trading and then it gradually 
decreases over the trading day, therefore showing a downward sloping pattern. For bilateral repos, 
the morning hourly dummies (until 12:00 p.m.) are not significant, reflecting the low trading 
activity during this part of the trading day. Only the hourly dummies for the afternoon appear highly 
significant (at the 1% level) and increasingly negative.  
Regarding the seasonal controls, in unreported results we observe that the end-of-month and the 
end-of-reserve-maintenance dummies carry positive and significant coefficients: repo spreads are 
higher at these times when banks tend to be more under pressure in their daily liquidity 
management (similar evidence is provided by Quiros and Mendizabal, 2006, and Jurgilas and Žikeš, 
2014). The coefficients of the interaction terms between the end-of-year dummy and the time-of-
day dummies are positive and significant in the morning hours of the trading day and negative in 
the afternoon hour from 2:00 to 3:00 pm, indicating a greater funding demand in the morning as the 
end of the year approaches. The coefficients for the days-of-the-week dummies (Monday, Tuesday, 
Thursday and Friday) are negative, but not statistically significant. Also their interactions with the 
time-of-the-day dummies are not statistically significant. Only if we exclude from the model the 
control for these interactions, the Friday dummy reports a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient. This may suggest a lower demand of funding at the end of the week, when the trading 
activity is lower than in other days, hence a lower repo spread. Finally, we notice that the estimated 
intraday patterns remain quantitatively similar when removing all these seasonal controls.  
Lastly, in further unreported results we verify that the downward pattern in the intraday ON GC 
repo rate is also obtained: (i) using individual repo trades (tick-by-tick data, as in Abbassi et al., 
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2017; Jurgilas and Žikeš, 2014); and (ii) using the difference between each intraday repo rate and its 
daily volume-weighted average as an alternative measure of intraday repo spread (as in Baglioni 
and Monticini, 2008; Kraenzlin and Nellen, 2010).12  
4. The determinants of the intraday repo spread 
In the previous section, we study only the intraday hourly patterns in repo spreads for both CCP and 
bilateral repos. The preliminary evidence in Section 2 suggests however that the intraday dynamics 
of repo spreads may be also affected by other factors and with different intensity during and after 
the ESDC. In this section, we first investigate the effects of collateral and repo market factors. Then 
we explore the impact of regulatory changes in margin policy. Finally, we look into the direct 
impact of counterparty risk. We perform the analysis on the full sample of repos, on CCP and 
bilateral repos separately, and on the ESDC and the post-crisis subsamples separately. 
4.1. Collateral and repo market factors 
We start by assuming, as in Boissel et al. (2017), that lenders can arbitrage between ON lending on 
the repo market at 𝐺𝐶 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ,𝑡 (where h indicates the hour of the repo transaction, t the day) 
and lending to the ECB with no risk at the deposit rate, 𝐸𝐶𝐵 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡. If the repo loan is risk free, it 
will be priced equal to the 𝐸𝐶𝐵 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡. We conjecture that in the presence of frictions and risk in the 
collateral and repo markets the price of the repo loans – 𝐺𝐶 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ,𝑡 – would be a function of 
both collateral and repo factors, as they were observed in the previous hour (𝑋ℎ−1,𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 and 𝑋ℎ−1,𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂). 




                                                     
12 All results that are unreported due to space constraints in the paper are available from the authors upon request. 
16 
 
𝐺𝐶 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ,𝑡 = 𝐸𝐶𝐵 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑆(𝑋ℎ−1,𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 , 𝑋ℎ−1,𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂)  (3) 
We can re-write (3) as the following implicit regression model: 
𝐺𝐶 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑ℎ,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑆(𝑋ℎ−1,𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 , 𝑋ℎ−1,𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂) +  𝜀𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 (4) 
Differently from all previous papers, we use a wide set of collateral characteristics (𝑋𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷) to 
explain variations of the intraday repo spread. Below, we list these factors and explain our 
hypotheses regarding their impact on the repo spread in terms of supply–demand or risk–return 
effects. 
In the GC repo market, dealers have to price the repo before they know which security will be 
provided as collateral. Thus, we assume they price the repo based on the characteristics of a 
representative security in the collateral basket. More specifically, on each day t we assume that they 
look at the average characteristics of a reference portfolio of bonds that have been selected as 
collateral in repo transactions over the previous trading month.  
We start by controlling for the supply level of Italian government bonds in the secondary MTS 
market. A higher bond supply in the secondary market indicates that banks can access more bond 
notional and use it as collateral to borrow at the ON GC repo rate (instead of borrowing at the 
higher rates offered in the ON unsecured funding markets). Therefore, there can be higher demand 
of ON GC repos. As the demand for ON GC repos from borrowing banks increases, the repo spread 
increases too. When collateral supply is instead limited (i.e. there are supply frictions in the 
collateral market), the GC repo demand decreases and so does its intraday repo spread. We take for 
each bond the average notional on sale at the top three levels of the dealer’s order book over each 
hour on each trading day. Then we build the cross-sectional average Bond Supply across all bonds 
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in the reference portfolio, and separately for bonds used in CCP-based and for bilaterally-traded 
repos. Appendix A provides all details on the construction of Bond Supply. Figure 3 plots average 
Bond Supply against the total outstanding notional value of Italian government bonds available in 
the secondary market (measured in euros). Both variables show an increasing trend over time, but 
the average Bond Supply displays greater variability around this trend, therefore capturing better the 
change in traders’ endowments of bonds in the secondary MTS market.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Next, we expect that the more liquid the bonds used as collateral, the lower the intraday repo 
spread: repo lenders receive good-quality safe collateral and the riskiness of the repo trade 
decreases. We use the relative bid–ask spread (Bond BAS) as proxy for bond liquidity. We take for 
each bond the average bid–ask spread over each hour on each trading day. Then we build the cross-
sectional average Bond BAS across all bonds in the reference portfolio, and separately for bonds 
used in CCP-based and for bilaterally-traded repos. Appendix A provides all details on the 
construction of Bond BAS.  
Finally, with higher bond credit and interest rate risk that can reduce the value of the collateral, the 
repo lender requires a higher intraday repo rate as compensation. Bond credit risk is already 
captured by the quoted bid–ask spread.13 We use the bond modified duration based on the last 
observed price of the bond for each hourly band on each specific day as the measure of collateral 
interest rate risk. We expect that the higher the average modified duration of the bonds used as 
collateral, the higher the interest rate risk exposure of the bonds, the higher the intraday GC repo 
                                                     
13 Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio and Uno (2016) show that the quoted bid–ask spreads of Italian treasuries are closely correlated 
with their credit risk, measured by the Italian CDS spread. As a consequence, controlling for other measures of sovereign risk would 




interest rate. Supply, liquidity and modified duration of the collateral bonds are constructed using 
tick-by-tick intraday data from MTS and implementing a sequence of filtering steps described in 
Appendix B. 
In addition to bond factors, we also consider supply–demand frictions and risk in the repo market. 
We control for the repo net order flow, i.e. the difference between aggregate volume of repos and 
aggregate volume of reverse repos for each hourly band, day and repo contract. We expect that a 
higher net order flow, indicating higher net demand pressure for GC repos, will lead to a wider repo 
spread. We also control for the number of trades in the repo market, for each day, hourly band and 
type of repo contract. An increase in the number of repo trades often happens when repo lending 
replaces riskier unsecured funding sources. In this case, repos work as a ‘shock absorber’ when 
funding risk is higher (Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer, 2016). This implies that a higher 
number of repo trades leads to a larger repo spread. Also, we control for repo volatility as a proxy 
for risk in the repo market. We measure it as the standard deviation of all repo rates for each hourly 
band computed over a 22-day rolling window. If the repo market is more volatile, the repo spread 
will be higher. 
As a final control variable, we consider the excess liquidity injected in the system by ECB 
unconventional interventions. Consistent with the ECB definition, we compute daily excess 
liquidity as the sum of credit institutions’ current account holdings and funds deposited at the ECB 
deposit facility minus their reserve requirements.14 A positive excess liquidity indicates a liquidity 
surplus in the financial system, which reduces the repo spread. Mancini et al. (2016) observe that 
the excess liquidity is inversely and nonlinearly related to the GC Pooling repo rate. When the repo 
rate hits the bottom of the ECB’s interest rate corridor, i.e. the deposit rate, it will no longer be 
                                                     




responsive to additional liquidity provision. On the contrary, additional provisions could even 
deteriorate the repo volumes and the marginal excess liquidity can become positively related to the 
repo rate. To allow for these non-linear effects we add the squared term of the ECB excess liquidity. 
Table 5, Panels A, B and C report summary statistics for all the explanatory variables. The average 
collateral bond across the whole sample has a secondary-market supply of €47 million, a bid–ask 
spread of 26 bps and around four years of modified duration. The difference between the average 
bond supply, bid-ask spread and modified duration of CCP-based and bilateral repos equal €0.6 
million, 2 bps and -0.09 years respectively. Although these differences are not substantial in 
magnitude, in unreported results we observe that they are statistically significant. There is higher 
net selling pressure (negative order flows), higher number of trades and lower volatility in the CCP 
segment than in the bilateral one. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
In Table 6, Panels A, B and C, we check the sample correlations between all variables. We observe 
higher correlations only between Bond Supply and Bond BAS (-59% for the whole sample, -63% 
for CCP, -53% for bilateral) and between Bond BAS and Repo Volatility (63% for the whole 
sample, 60% for CCP, 70% for bilateral). We observe negative correlation between Bond Modified 
Duration and Excess Liquidity, ranging between 53% and 66%, mostly recorded over the post-crisis 
period (from February 2012 to June 2014), when the excess liquidity gradually decreases from its 
high levels of the ESDC period, while the average bond modified duration gradually increases. 
[Insert Table 6 about here]
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4.2. Model specification 
We estimate the following model:  
𝐺𝐶 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑ℎ,𝑡  = 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦ℎ−1,𝑡   + 𝛽2 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝐴𝑆ℎ−1,𝑡   +
𝛽3 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑑. 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛ℎ−1,𝑡   +  𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤ℎ−1,𝑡   +
 𝛽5 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ−1,𝑡   + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦ℎ−1,𝑡   + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐶𝑃ℎ−1,𝑡  + 𝛽8 𝐸𝐿𝑡−1   +
 𝛽9 𝐸𝐿𝑡−1
2   +  ∑ 𝛼ℎ𝑥ℎ,𝑡
7





ℎ=1 + 𝜖ℎ,𝑡  
(((5) 
 
We use all lagged variables (h-1) on the right-hand side of equation (5) to avoid endogeneity 
problems. All beta-coefficients, except the one of excess liquidity (β8), are expected to be positive.  
As in model (2), we also control for time-of-day effects (𝑥ℎ,𝑡) and for seasonal effects (𝑋𝑡) 
interacted with hourly dummies 𝑥ℎ,𝑡. When we perform the regression on the aggregate sample of 
repos, we also include the CCP dummy. 
4.3.  Empirical results 
First, we estimate model (5) using pooled OLS with Newey-West HAC robust standard errors for 
both CCP and bilateral repos together. Then the same model (5) is estimated separately for CCP-
based repos and bilateral repos. The results are reported in Table 7 for the ‘All Repos’ sample 
(columns 1 to 4), the ‘CCP-based repos’ subsample (columns 5 to 8) and the ‘Bilateral repos’ 
subsample (columns 9 to 12).  
In order to account for the highly correlated regressors (Bond BAS and Bond Supply, Bond BAS 
and Repo Volatility, and Bond Modified Duration and Excess Liquidity), we start by introducing 
them sequentially. In the first specification (columns 1, 5, and 9) we include Bond Supply, Bond 
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Modified Duration and Bond BAS and exclude any repo factor (so to avoid the high collinearity 
between Bond BAS and Repo Volatility). In the second specification (columns 2, 6 and 10) we 
include Bond BAS and exclude both Bond Supply and Repo Volatility. If we compare the two 
different specifications in columns 1 and 2, however, we notice only a small reduction in the 
estimated coefficients of Bond BAS and Bond Modified Duration (not in their level of statistical 
significance) when we use the more complete specification. In the third specification (columns 3, 7, 
and 11) we include Bond Supply and Repo Volatility and drop Bond BAS. If we examine the two 
different specifications in columns 2 and 3, we notice only a change in the estimated constant and in 
the magnitude of the Lag Repo Trades coefficient (not in its level of statistical significance). In the 
fourth specification (columns 4, 8 and 12), we keep Bond Supply, Bond BAS, and Repo Volatility 
and instead drop Bond Modified Duration to include a control for Excess Liquidity and its squared 
value. Although controlling for Repo Volatility and Excess Liquidity renders Bond BAS 
insignificant, this most complete specification of model (5) in columns 4, 8 and 12 explains almost 
half of intraday repo spread variation (about 48%, 50% and 46% for all repos, CCP-based repos and 
bilateral repos, respectively). We compute the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the 
correlated regressor used in this specification in order to mitigate concerns of multicollinearity. VIF 
(Mansfield & Helms, 1982) measures whether the variance of the regressor coefficient is inflated 
due to high correlation with other regressors in the model. By rule of thumb, a VIF greater than 10 
signals the presence of possible multicollinearity. Bond BAS, Bond Supply and Repo Volatility 
have VIFs of about 3, 2, and 2, respectively. This suggests that there is no clear indication that we 
should remove one of these regressors because of multicollinearity issues.  
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
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We start our discussion of the results from the collateral characteristics. As conjectured, the intraday 
repo spread increases significantly with higher Bond Supply. In economic terms,15 a one standard 
deviation increase in Bond Supply induces an increase in the intraday repo spread of 5.14 bps, 3.07 
bps and 7.83 bps for all repos, CCP and bilateral repos, respectively. Bond BAS is significant at the 
1% level for all repos, CCP-based repos and bilaterally-traded repos with the hypothesised positive 
coefficient. The less liquid the bonds, the costlier it is to obtain repo funding. A one standard 
deviation increase in Bond BAS induces an increase of 6.15 bps (all repos), 5.47 bps (CCP-based 
repos) and 6.51 bps (bilateral repos). Bond Modified Duration is significant at the 1% level with the 
expected positive sign. The higher the interest rate risk of the bonds, the higher the intraday repo 
spread demanded by repo traders. A one standard deviation change in Bond Modified Duration 
generates an increase of 4.13 bps (all repos), 2.25 bps (CCP-based repos) and 6.79 bps (bilateral 
repos) in the intraday repo spread, ceteris paribus. 
Next, we consider the repo characteristics. Repo Net Order Flow displays the conjectured positive 
sign and it is significant at the 1% level. Greater repo net demand increases the intraday repo 
spread. The economic impact of Repo Net Order Flow on the intraday repo spread is of 1.57 bps (all 
repos), 1.97 bps (CCP-based repos) and 1.22 bps (bilateral repos) standard deviations.16 Repo trades 
have positive coefficients that are significant at the 5% level for the aggregate repo sample and at 
the 1% level for CCP-based repos and bilaterally-traded repos. A one standard deviation change in 
Repo Trades induces an increase of 0.61 bps (all repos), 0.86 bps (CCP-based repos) and 1.44 bps 
(bilateral repos) in the intraday repo spread. Finally, Repo Volatility is also positively related to the 
intraday repo spread and its coefficients are highly significant at the 1% level. The higher the repo 
                                                     
15 The economic impact of an independent variable is calculated as the product between the standard deviation of that independent 
variable and the estimated coefficient (over the specific subsample considered). When calculating the economic impact of the 
collateral characteristics, we refer to their estimated coefficients in Table 7, column 1 (for the aggregate sample), 5 (for CCP-based 
repos) and 9 (for bilateral repos). 
16 We refer to Table 7, columns 4, 8 and 12 for the purpose of discussing the economic impact of the repo factors and excess liquidity 
on the intraday repo spread of the aggregate sample, CCP-based repos and bilateral repos, respectively. 
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volatility, the higher the uncertainty in funding conditions, and the higher the intraday repo spread. 
Repo Volatility has a high economic impact on the intraday repo spread: a one standard deviation 
increase in Repo Volatility induces an increase of 7.59 bps (all repos), 6.97 bps (CCP-based repos) 
and 8.46 bps (bilateral repos) on the intraday repo spread.  
Excess Liquidity (EL) is significant at the 1% level with the expected negative sign: the higher the 
excess liquidity, the lower the repo spread. However, the squared term of the EL is positive and 
statistically significant. We are interested in the overall economic impact of the EL: a one standard 
deviation change in EL generates a decrease of -7.02 bps (all repos), -6.88 bps (CCP-based repos) 
and -6.75 bps (bilateral repos) in the intraday repo spread as a cumulative impact, ceteris paribus. 
Regarding the time-of-day effects, there is persistent evidence of a downward sloping pattern in the 
GC hourly repo spread. Since we control for more effects now, the estimated coefficients of the 
time-of-day dummies are smaller in size in Table 7 than in Table 4, however, they are still 
decreasing over the hours of the trading day and most of them remain statistically significant. 
Interestingly, when we add the control for Excess Liquidity (columns 4, 8, and 12 of Table 7) the 
impact of the time-of-day dummies on the GC hourly repo spread is drastically reduced. The excess 
liquidity available in the interbank market assuages the pressure for borrowing banks of not meeting 
their end-of-day liquidity needs on time. It is this specific pressure that pushes banks to behave 
cautiously and access extra overnight liquidity via the repo market in the earlier hours of the day 
generating the downward intraday pattern in the repo spread.  
We observe that the dummy CCP has a significant negative coefficient in Table 7, columns 1, 2 and 
3. This indicates that on average CCP-based contracts have lower repo spreads than bilateral 
contracts, after controlling for all collateral and repo factors. However, in column 4, once we also 
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control for the excess liquidity, the CCP dummy variable retains the negative sign, but it is no more 
statistically significant.  
Next, we split the entire dataset into two sub-periods and re-estimate model (5) over each of them. 
The results are reported in Table 8 for the aggregate sample of repos (columns 1 to 4), for CCP-
based repos (columns 5 to 8) and bilateral repos (columns 9 to 12). The first sub-period starts on 
January 4, 2010 and ends on February 10, 2012. This is the core period of the ESDC characterised 
by several ECB non-standard monetary policy interventions: (i) from May 10, 2010 until March 25, 
2011 – the first activation period of the Securities Market Programme (SMP), involving the outright 
purchase by the ECB of government securities issued by Greece, Portugal and Ireland; (ii) from 
August 8, 2011 until February 10, 2012 – the second activation period of the SMP for Italian and 
Spanish government bonds; (iii) on December 21, 2011 – the start of the first three-year LTRO, 
granting secured loans with maturity of three years with an option of early repayment. The second 
sub-period, which runs from February 11, 2012 until November 30, 2015, is a relatively more 
tranquil post-crisis period, supported by further ECB interventions.17 
In columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 of Table 8 we use the most complete specification of model (5) (i.e. 
the fourth specification used in Table 7) with Bond BAS, Bond Supply, Repo Volatility, and Excess 
Liquidity, but without Bond Modified Duration. In columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 we add a model 
specification excluding Bond BAS as possible source of multicollinearity to check whether there is 
any visible bias in the estimated coefficients of the remaining variables. The coefficients of the 
                                                     
17 On February 29, 2012 a second three-year LTRO is implemented by the ECB; while on July 26, 2012 Mr Mario Draghi, President 
of the ECB, announces his willingness to implement all possible measures (‘Whatever it takes’) to restore normal market conditions. 
On June 5, 2014, the ECB Governing Council announce the expanded asset purchase programme (EAPP) and two new four-year 
LTROs on September 18, 2014 and December 11, 2014. In addition, on September 4, 2014 the ECB main refinancing rate was 
lowered by 0.10% and two new purchase programmes started for both asset-backed securities and covered bonds issued by euro area 
financial institutions. On January 22, 2015 the ECB Governing Council announced the expansion of purchase programmes to the 




explanatory variables are all similar across the two different specifications and carry the same level 
of statistical significance.  
In Table 8, we observe two main findings. First, the estimated coefficient of Bond Supply is 
positive in the crisis period, while negative and much smaller in magnitude in the post-crisis period. 
During the ESDC repo borrowers are under high funding stress. In the same period, the large initial 
purchase of Italian Government bonds by the ECB forcedly reduces the available supply of bonds in 
the secondary markets. With bond scarcity acting as a more binding constraint to the ability of 
doing repos, repo borrowers react more to any marginal increase in the available bond supply by 
demanding more GC repos and producing a rise in the repo spread. During the calmer post-crisis 
period, when repo borrowers are less funding-constrained and more adept at the ECB bond 
purchasing programme, Bond Supply has a much diminished impact on the repo spread. A higher 
Bond Supply may also act as a signal of calmer intervention by the ECB, generally driven by lower 
sovereign risk: so the cost of doing ON GC repos may even decrease. 
Second, Bond BAS is significant over the ESDC period, but insignificant in the post-crisis period. 
Also, the repo factors and the excess liquidity have stronger economic impact on the repo spread 
during the ESDC. In the post-crisis period these factors still appear significant, but have a much 
lower impact.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Overall, the sub-period results suggest that the ECB interventions and the high level of liquidity 
surplus provided by the ECB to the European financial system have contributed to reducing the 
influence of risk and frictions in the collateral and repo markets on the ON GC repo spread.  
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For brevity Table 8 does not report the estimated coefficients of the hourly dummies, but Figure 4 
shows that the intraday downward pattern in the repo spread is clearly defined only during the 
ESDC. In the post-crisis period, the pattern is almost flat for both CCP-based and bilateral repos. 
This finding confirms our hypothesis that it is mostly during stressed periods that banks opt for 
more cautious liquidity management and borrow more funds via repos in the morning. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Finally, in Table 8 we observe that the CCP dummy is insignificant in the sub-sample analysis. 
Although CCP-based repos should provide mitigation of counterparty credit risk, especially during 
the ESDC they behave rather like bilateral repos and are affected by the same factors. This result 
shows that the use of CCPs is not enough to prevent the repo traders from reacting to increasing 
sovereign and funding stress. We now look further into this point by examining the effect of 
changes in CCP margin costs. 
4.4.  Changes in margin costs 
Margins are the preferred instrument adopted by the CCPs to mitigate the impact of counterparty 
risk in repos. During the period considered in our study, there have been important changes in the 
margin policies set by the CCPs. For instance, on November 8, 2011, at the peak of the Italian 
sovereign debt crisis, the CCP increases the margins required for Italian repos as a reaction to the 
deterioration of the creditworthiness of the Italian government guarantees. The margin increase 
ranges from 350 bps for bonds with duration of less than one year to 500 bps points for bonds with 
duration of more than seven years.  
The International Monetary Fund, the Bank of Italy, and the European Union have criticised the 
margin policies adopted during the ESDC as being responsible for a further deterioration in funding 
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costs and a possible negative procyclical effect. The theoretical model by Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) supports these considerations. Here we examine the alleged procyclical behaviour 
of the CCP margin policies in the Italian ON GC repo market. If margins are endogenous – i.e. they 
simply reflect the higher riskiness of the collateral – then they should not appear significant when 
added to the right-hand side of equation (5), where we already control for higher bond riskiness. If 
instead the margin increases are procyclical, then we expect that higher margin costs will have a 
further positive and significant effect on the ON GC intraday repo spread. 
Table 9 illustrates the results of this check. We observe that higher margin costs during the crisis 
period further deteriorates repo funding conditions (a negative procyclical effect); while, in the 
post-crisis period, margin costs do not significantly impact the intraday repo spread. Margins have 
been changed by the CCPs also over the post-crisis period. However, in this case, the more 
favourable funding conditions – e.g. high excess liquidity in the European banking system – may 
have alleviated their potential negative procyclical effect on the intraday repo spread. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In addition, in columns 1 to 6 of Table 9 we notice that the CCP dummy and the interaction term 
between margin costs and CCP dummy (measuring the differential impact of margin costs on CCP-
based/bilateral repos) are not statistically significant. The CCP-based repos are not significantly 
cheaper than the bilateral repos.  
We see that during the ESDC margin costs are significant for both CCP-based and bilateral repos, 
but the impact on the CCP-based repos is higher: a one standard deviation change in margin costs 
generates an increase of 9.79 bps (all repos), 11.08 bps (CCP-based repos) and 8.31 bps (bilateral 
repos) in the intraday repo spread (Table 9, columns 2, 8 and 12). The economic impact of changes 
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in margin costs is almost null in the post-crisis period (Table 9, columns 5, 10 and 14). Although 
margin costs are borne only by traders who do repos via the CCP, they are significant also for 
bilateral repos because: i) they lead to negative procyclical effects; and ii) signal higher 
counterparty credit risk, therefore traders on the bilateral segment will protect themselves by 
increasing the cost of the repo. In the next sub-section we investigate this latter point.  
4.5. Counterparty risk 
We now check how bilaterally-traded and CCP-based repo spreads vary with the counterparty credit 
risk of Italian banks, computed as the difference between the daily CDS mid-quote for the Italian 
banking sector18 and the sovereign CDS mid-quote for Italy (Excess Bank CDS). The results are 
presented in Appendix C – Table C.1. 
In Table C.1 we see that higher credit risk of the banks-counterparties increases the repo costs for 
both the CCP and bilateral segment, particularly during the ESDC. The interaction term between 
Excess Banks’ CDS premium and CCP dummy (measuring the differential impact of counterparty 
risk on the CCP/bilateral segment) is not statistically significant. Furthermore, during the ESDC the 
economic impact of counterparty risk is higher for the CCP than for the bilateral repos: a one 
standard deviation change in the Excess Bank CDS generates an increase of 5.02 bps in the CCP-
based repo spread and 4.32 bps in the bilateral repo spread (Table C.1, columns 2, 8 and 12). This is 
a surprising result, given that the CCP should reduce the exposure of the repo contract to 
counterparty risk. 
We also control separately for the excess CDS premium of larger and smaller Italian banks (by 
market capitalisation) and observe that although larger banks are considered in general ‘safer’ than 
                                                     
18 To understand the importance of banks as counterparties in the repo sector, MTS repo specialists have confirmed that more than 
60% of volume of ON GC repo is traded by Italian banks. Data for CDS mid-quotes are sourced from Bloomberg. 
29 
 
smaller banks, their credit risk impact on the repo cost is higher because larger banks are more 
active counterparties in repo contracts, given their reputation and their wider network of contacts in 
the repo business. The results of this check are also reported in Appendix C (Tables C.2 and C.3). 
We perform several robustness checks on the main results of this section and report them all in 
Appendix D. 
5. Collateral selection for GC repos  
In this section, we assess how repo traders choose the collateral bond.  
The tested hypotheses are the following:  
(i) The larger the availability of a bond, the higher its probability of being selected as collateral;  
(ii) The higher the bond riskiness (so the higher its bid–ask spread and its modified duration), the 
more likely it is for traders to select the bond as collateral for the GC repo.  
If having optionality, borrowing banks prefer using riskier and more illiquid bonds as collateral in 
GC repos in order to keep safer and more liquid bonds ‘unencumbered’ for regulatory purposes, for 
management of unexpected liquidity needs, or for use as collateral in special repos. According to 
Duffie (1996) model, liquid bonds are more likely to be used in special repos where the borrower 
specifies a unique bond as collateral at the outset of a repo transaction and pays a (generally) lower 
rate than the GC repo rate. We expect liquid bonds to be more likely used in special repos and less 
likely used in GC repos. 
 (iii) The higher the specialness of the bond, the cheaper its use in the special repo market, so the 
less likely it is for the bond to be chosen as collateral in GC repos.  
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We estimate the following logit model: 
P Prob. of Selectioni,t
=  α +  β1 Bond Outstanding Amounti,t−1  +  β2 Bond BASi,t−1   
+  β3 Bond Mod. Durationi,t−1   +  β4 Bond Mod. Durationi,t−1
2  
+  β5 Bond Specialnessi,t−1   +γ′ Xt + ϵi,t 
(((6) 
where i indicates the bond and t the day. The dependent variable in equation (6) is a binary variable 
that takes the value of one if the bond is selected at least once as collateral in a repo trade on day t 
and zero otherwise.19 The explanatory variables are: the bond total outstanding notional amount,20  
the bond bid–ask spread, the bond modified duration and its squared term, and the bond specialness 
measured as the difference between the GC rate and the bond special repo rate.21 All explanatory 
variables in equation (6) are bond-specific, computed at a daily frequency, and lagged by one day.22 
We estimate the logit model with HC robust standard errors and bond fixed effects23 first for the 
whole sample of repos, then separately for CCP-based repos and bilaterally-traded repos, and over 
the ESDC and post-crisis periods. All results are reported in Table 10.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
                                                     
19 We have also employed two alternative measures for the dependent variable. The first measure is computed as the ratio between 
the daily nominal transacted volume for each bond collateral and the nominal transacted volume for the all collateral bonds used on 
the same day. The second measure is the ratio between the daily transacted quantities of each bond collateral (calculated as daily 
nominal transacted volume for the bond collateral divided by its daily price) and the daily aggregate transacted quantities of all 
collateral bonds used on the same day. These measures indicate how many times a bond is chosen as collateral on day t. Results are 
qualitatively similar. Correlations between the explanatory variables are the following: 11% between Bond Outstanding Amount and 
Bond BAS, 35% between Bond Outstanding Amount and Bond Modified Duration, 2% between Specialness and Bond Outstanding 
Amount, 27% between Margin Costs and Bond Outstanding Amount, 50% between Bond BAS and Bond Modified Duration, 5% 
between Bond BAS and Specialness, 43% between Bond BAS and Margin Costs, 5% between Bond Modified Duration and 
Specialness, 74% between Bond Modified Duration and Margin Costs (never included together as explanatory variables), and 32% 
between Margin Costs and Specialness. 
20 The outstanding amount of bonds is calculated from data on auctions conducted in the primary market by the Bank of Italy in 
collaboration with the Italian Treasury. See the following links: http://www.dt.tesoro.it/en/debito_pubblico, 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/. 
21 We use ‘tomorrow next’ (TN) GC and special repos, since TN repos are the most frequently traded special repos in MTS. 
22 The model has been estimated also at intraday frequency and results are robust. 
23 Since some bonds may be transacted more on special than others, especially if they have been targeted for particular trading 
strategies, we need to control for bond fixed effects. Also F-tests and Hausman (1978) tests confirm the need to control for bond 
fixed effects, but not for random effects.  
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Looking at the full sample (Table 10, column 1), all explanatory variables are highly significant at 
the 1% level and with the expected signs of coefficients. Ceteris paribus, every additional €3 billion 
of notional issued by the Italian Treasury (average size of an auction) increases the probability for 
the bond to be chosen on average by 1.56%. If the bid–ask spread increases by 1 bp, the marginal 
probability increases by 0.04%. A large increase in the Bond BAS of 250 bps during the crisis could 
trigger an increase in the marginal probability of 10% on average. For every additional year of 
modified duration, the probability increases in total by 1.095%.24 Finally, for every additional 1 bp 
of specialness, the probability decreases by 0.16%. To understand the economic significance of this 
latter variable, we need to bear in mind that the bond specialness reached a peak of more than 100 
bps for 10-year BTPs during the ESDC (see Dufour, Marra, Sangiorgi, and Skinner, 2019). 
Although the variables’ marginal impacts look small in absolute terms, we must consider that the 
first criterion for a borrowing bank to choose a bond as collateral for the repo is to hold it in its 
portfolio. Even though borrowing banks have limited optionality, our results show that they will 
exercise it rationally. 
Looking at the CCP-based and bilateral repos in Table 10, columns 2 and 7, we see that the bond 
modified duration for CCP-based repos appears with a negative coefficient: the lower the bond 
modified duration, the higher the bond’s probability of being selected as collateral for CCP-based 
repos. This sign inversion may be related to the higher margins set by the CCP for longer maturity 
collateral, which increase the cost of repo trading. Therefore, a borrowing bank may be incentivised 
to reduce the margin costs by selecting shorter-maturity collateral for the CCP-based repo. In 
addition, we see that the bond outstanding amount carries a negative sign for bilateral repos and a 
positive sign for CCP-based repos. Taken together, these results suggest that longer maturity bonds 
                                                     




with higher modified duration and relatively lower outstanding amount are mostly used for bilateral 
repo trading where there are no specific margin requirements, while bonds with relatively shorter 
durations and in higher supply are chosen more often as collateral in the CCP-based repos to lower 
the margin costs. 
We also explore whether the impact of these factors on the probability of collateral selection 
changes over time (see Table 10, columns 3, 5, 8 and 10). We use the same two sub-periods of the 
previous analysis in Section 4. The Bond Modified Duration has a positive effect for bilateral repos 
in both subsamples. Instead, for the CCP segment a negative sign is detected during the crisis 
period, when shorter duration bonds are preferred as collateral to longer duration bonds (the 
opposite is true after the crisis). We also observe a negative coefficient for Bond BAS for the CCP 
segment over the crisis subsample. Thus, during the ESDC period borrowers prefer using more 
liquid and shorter-maturity collateral in ON GC repos in order to avoid paying higher margins at the 
CCP. After the crisis, longer-maturity risky bonds are again those with a higher probability of being 
chosen as collateral for a CCP-based repo, despite this increasing the costs of using the CCP. 
Next, we control directly for CCP margin costs. When margin costs are used as explanatory 
variables the Bond Modified Duration is dropped as they have 74% correlation. The results are 
reported in Table 10 at columns 4, 6, 9 and 11 and show that during the ESDC the higher the 
margin that needs to be paid for a specific collateral bond, the lower the probability that that bond is 
selected as collateral for CCP-based repos. Margin costs are instead insignificant to explain the 
choice of collateral in bilateral repos. Also, for bilateral repos the Bond BAS relates negatively to 
the probability that a bond will be selected as collateral during the ESDC period. Given that these 
repos do not offer any protection against counterparty risk, more liquid collateral is preferred in 
order to reduce the risk of not being able to liquidate the collateral in case one’s counterparty fails 
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to return the borrowed funds. In the post-crisis period, when the pressure from the collateral market 
decreases, the Bond BAS presents a positive coefficient: traders in the bilateral segment continue 
preferring to use riskier, more illiquid bonds as collateral and to keep more liquid bonds 
‘unencumbered’ for regulatory purposes and management of unexpected liquidity needs. 
6. Summary and implications of the results 
In this paper, we study the dynamics and determinants of intraday ON GC repos on Italian 
Government bonds and the criteria behind repo borrowers’ collateral selection. The ON GC repo is 
the main instrument used by banks for their intraday liquidity management, so any temporary shift 
or structural change in the ON GC repo market or in the collateral market can greatly affect these 
financial institutions. We use a rich intraday dataset of Italian repos and collateral bonds over the 
period from January 2010 to November 2015. 
In the paper’s introduction we asked four questions. First, we asked whether there is any intraday 
pattern in the ON GC intraday repo spread (over the ECB deposit rate). We find a downward 
sloping pattern. Due to the incentive of Italian banks to ensure funding liquidity at the beginning of 
the day, the repo spread is higher in the second hour of the trading day; then it tends to decrease 
steadily until closure. This pattern is accentuated during the ESDC period, due to a more risk-averse 
behaviour of the banks in their liquidity management.  
Second, we asked which factors affect the ON GC intraday repo spread and whether their impact 
changes over time. We find that bond supply, liquidity and modified duration explain part of the 
variation of the intraday repo spread. The subsample analysis reveals, however, that their absolute 
impact is much higher during the ESDC period than during the post-crisis period. We interpret this 
result as evidence that the ECB quantitative easing interventions were highly effective in reducing 
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the influence of the collateral market conditions on the repo spread. In addition to that, higher ECB 
liquidity injections in the banking system help reducing the ON GC repo spread. Taken together, 
our results unveil the important impact of ECB policies on sovereign repo markets. 
Third, we asked whether there is any significant difference between ON GC repos cleared by a CCP 
and those traded bilaterally. We notice that the bulk of the bilateral trading starts when CCP trading 
stops (at 12:30 p.m.). Due to the mitigation of counterparty credit risk, the CCP-based repo spread 
is on average lower than the bilateral repo spread. However, during the ESDC we observe a lack of 
cost-differentiation between the two market segments. Increased margin costs during the ESDC 
period deteriorate repo funding conditions by increasing the repo spread and creating a negative 
procyclical effect. Although margin costs are incremented by the CCPs also over the post-crisis 
period, the more favourable funding conditions then (e.g. high excess liquidity in the European 
banking system) may have alleviated their potential negative procyclical effect on the intraday repo 
spread. Interestingly, we see that since higher margins signal higher counterparty risk, they have an 
indirect impact also on the bilateral repo spread, even if traders do not pay CCP margins to trade 
bilaterally. To prove this point, we show that the higher credit risk of the banks-counterparties 
increases repo costs for both the CCP and bilateral segments, particularly during the ESDC. This is 
a surprising result, given that the CCP should reduce the exposure of the repo contract to 
counterparty risk. 
Finally, we asked which bond characteristics determine the probability of selection of a particular 
government security to be used as collateral in Italian GC repos. We find that bonds with lower 
liquidity, greater market supply and higher modified duration are more likely to be selected as 
collateral in GC repos. We also show that bonds with higher specialness are less likely to be used 
for GC repos as they can be more cheaply used to raise funds in the special repo segment. However, 
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during the ESDC, we see that CCP-repo borrowers are more likely to choose bonds with lower 
modified duration and higher liquidity. The higher level of margins imposed by the CCP in this 
period incentivises borrowers to select higher-quality and more liquid collateral in order to reduce 
CCP-based repo costs. We find that during the ESDC the higher the margin that needs to be paid for 
a specific collateral bond, the lower the probability that the bond is selected as collateral for CCP-
based repos. These results reveal a clear impact of CCP margin policies on repo collateral selection. 
The main implications of the paper are the following: 
1) It is important for banks that routinely use ON GC repos for their daily liquidity management to 
strategically decide the time of the day when to trade a repo contract. Our evidence shows that, 
particularly in periods of high systematic-funding stress, ON GC repo spreads are higher at the start 
than at the end of the day. Therefore, a less funding-constrained bank may decide to ‘wait longer’ 
and access this ON secured cash at a lower cost just before the end of its business hours. 
2) The ON GC repo market responds efficiently to increased risks coming from the collateral bond 
market (increasing repo spreads), as well as to Central Bank interventions aimed at reducing the 
impact of such risks.  
3) The regulatory call for more central clearance in the repo market must be assessed against the 
evidence on the effectiveness of CCPs in reducing counterparty risk and its associated costs and on 
the implications of changes in margin policy. Our paper shows that the mechanism of mitigation of 
counterparty risk does not prevent CCP-based repo spreads from increasing with higher risk in the 
collateral market, albeit at a lower extent than bilateral repos. In periods of high stress CCP-based 
repo spreads are not always lower than bilateral spreads and this is mainly due to the increase in 
margin costs. The higher margin costs can produce negative pro-cyclical effects and distortions in 
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the collateral selection process of the borrowing banks. In other words, CCPs may introduce more 
frictions into the repo market. 
The analysis of this paper is based on the Italian repo market. This specific market serves as a good 
example of the consequences of higher sovereign risk and resulting frictions on the secondary 
government bond market (illiquidity, higher margins, etc.). Any country that suffers at some point 
from the same conditions has the potential to see those risks and frictions transferred onto the ON 
GC repo market with a dangerous impact on banks' liquidity management. This could be the case 












Appendix A. Construction of bond bid–ask spread and bond supply  
The methodology of construction of these variables follows Darbha and Dufour (2013). 
A.1. Bond bid–ask spread  
First, the hourly Bond BAS for each bond is constructed as follows.  
For each bond i, we calculate the intraday bid–ask spread related to a specific quote j as: 
𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗−𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑗
(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑗+𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗)/2
. Ask and Bid are the ask and bid prices respectively. We assign to each of these 
intraday bid-ask spreads a weight equal to the portion of trading hour when quote j remains 
available in the market before the next quote update. Then, we compute the hourly BAS as a time-
weighted average:  







 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 ℎ,𝑡
)      (A.1) 
t indicates a specific day and h = 1, 2, …, 8 an hourly band. T is the time stamp for the jth quote 
update measured in seconds from midnight, (𝑇𝑖,𝑗+1 − 𝑇𝑖,𝑗) is the length of time during which quote j 
remains available before being updated, Total Time is the overall time in seconds that quotes are 
available for the hourly band h on day t (i.e. the time elapsing from the first proposal during the 
hourly band h on day t to the end of that hourly band), and Qh,t is the total number of quotes updates 
for the hourly band h on day t. 
Second, we build a weighted-average bid–ask spread across all bonds (as portfolio-weighted 
averages), and separately for bonds used in CCP-based repos and in bilaterally-traded repos for 
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each hourly band of each trading day. The portfolio weights on day t are calculated as the ratio 
between the quantity of each bond used as collateral and the total quantity of transacted collateral 
over the previous month (i.e. the previous 22 days starting from the day t-1). 
We include in our ‘portfolio’ only bonds that have been actually used as collateral in the previous 
22 days (or one month of trading), rather than including all available bonds, in order to capture 
better the average characteristics of the collateral. As over some days/weeks, repo trade volumes are 
small and only a limited number of bonds are used as collateral, we use 22 days as our time 
window. We assume that repo traders manage their baskets of collateral as portfolios from which to 
choose the bonds to be delivered in GC repos. We also apply portfolio daily rebalancing in order to 
capture variations in the collateral characteristics.  
A.2. Bond supply 
First, the hourly Bond Supply for each bond is constructed as follows.  
For a given bond i, MTS reports the top three ask quotes at which dealers are prepared to sell bonds, 
with the relative bond notional amounts.  
For each  specific ask quote j for bond i during hour h, we calculate the supply for bond i as the sum 
of these notional amounts. This represents the total amount of bond notional available for sale in the 
order book at the top three levels of the dealers’ ask price.  
Every time a new quote j comes in, the bond’s order book is updated, so the resulting top three 
levels of the ask price change and the sum of the notional amounts associated to these quotes 
(𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑖,𝑗) changes too. 
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Then we calculate the hourly Bond Supply as the time-weighted average of all 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑖,𝑗within a given hour: 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑖,𝑗
𝑄ℎ,𝑡
𝑗=1  𝑥 (
𝑇𝑖,𝑗+1−𝑇𝑖,𝑗
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 ℎ,𝑡
)      (A.2) 
where t indicates a specific day, and h = 1, 2, …, 8 a hourly band.  
Ti,j is the time stamp for quote j (measured in seconds from midnight). 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑖,𝑗 is 
multiplied by the length of time during which quote j remains available before being updated 
(𝑇𝑖,𝑗+1 − 𝑇𝑖,𝑗) over the Total Time. Total Time is the overall time in seconds that quotes are 
available for the hourly band h on day t (i.e. the time elapsing from the first proposal during the 
hourly band h on day t to the end of that hourly band). Qh,t is the total number of quotes updates for 
the hourly band h on day t. 
Second, we build a weighted-average bond supply across all bonds (as portfolio-weighted 
averages), and separately for bonds used in CCP-based repos and in bilaterally-traded repos for 
each hourly band of each trading day in the same way we have explained it for the bid-ask spread. 
The portfolio weights on day t are calculated as the ratio between the quantity of each bond used as 
collateral and the total quantity of transacted collateral over the previous month (i.e. the previous 22 





Appendix B. Filtering steps for bond data  
In our study, we examine the relationship between the ON GC intraday repo spread and the intraday 
liquidity, modified duration and supply of the collateral bonds. These bond variables are 
constructed using tick-by-tick intraday data from MTS and implementing the same sequence of 
steps as in Dufour et al. (2019): 
 We consider only bond quotes recorded during the regular daily trading hours from 8:15 a.m. 
until 5:00 p.m. CET and discard the last 30 minutes of the trading day.  
 In order to account for latency issues, we assign the same time stamp to quotes submitted to 
parallel platforms – MTS and Euro MTS – when they have the same price and are recorded with a 
small time delay of up to 3 milliseconds.  
 We construct the consolidated order-book using both MTS and Euro MTS quotes and compute 
the overall best bid and ask prices. 
 We discard consolidated quotes with negative bid–ask spreads. These may appear when the best 
quotes on the two alternative platforms diverge temporarily. 
 We discard quotes with extremely high bid–ask spreads, since trade execution is unlikely to take 
place when bid–ask spreads are so large. On MTS, dealers with market–making obligations cannot 
remove their quotes, but they are allowed to temporarily increase the spread to signal that they are 
not active. Short periods of unreasonably high bid–ask spreads are often the result of dealers 
increasing simultaneously their ask quotes and/or reducing their bid quotes. No trades are executed 
at these extreme quote levels. Therefore, we determine a maximum tradable spread level by 
conducting an ad-hoc analysis of the distributions over time of the relative bid–ask spreads 
observed in the consolidated order books before trade executions. We winsorise proposals with 
relative bid–ask spreads greater than the 99th percentile of the distributions, for every maturity 
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bucket, quarter and instrument class. This technique ensures that no extreme bias from periods of 
low trading intensity during the day (e.g. from 8:15 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.), as well as from times of 




Appendix C. The effect of counterparty risk on repo spreads 
Table C.1: Counterparty risk – pooled regression results for model (5) over two sub-periods 
This table reports the regression results for model (5) of pooled OLS regression results over two sub-periods. European sovereign debt crisis (ESDC) sub-period: January 4, 2010 to February 10, 
2012. Post-crisis period: February 11, 2012 to November 30, 2015. Pooled regressions are estimated with HAC robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the GC Hourly Repo Spread. 
Excess Bank CDS = CDS mid-quote for the Italian banking sector (calculated as the weighted average of CDS mid-quotes for Italian banks, with weights equal to their relative average market 
capitalisation over a 22-day rolling window) minus sovereign CDS mid-quote for Italy. Other variables’ definitions and measurements are explained Table 5. Repo Net Order Flow is measured here 
in billions of euros. EL2 is rescaled over 1,000. T-statistics are reported in brackets. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
All Repos CCP-based Repos Bilateral Repos 
Period ESDC Post-Crisis ESDC Post-Crisis ESDC Post-Crisis  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Constant -0.082 4.335 4.338 27.928*** 27.024*** 27.301*** 1.797 5.886 25.733*** 25.033*** 0.071 4.078 28.908*** 28.270*** 
 
(-0.02) (1.04) (1.04) (18.83) (17.41) (16.87) (0.41) (1.21) (13.16) (12.34) (0.01) (0.63) (14.22) (13.10) 
Lag Bond Supply 0.545*** 0.441*** 0.441*** -0.066*** -0.046*** -0.047*** 0.534*** 0.431*** -0.055*** -0.035 0.552*** 0.457*** -0.075*** -0.064*** 
  (8.58) (6.02) (6.02) (-4.61) (-2.86) (-2.90) (6.44) (4.58) (-2.65) (-1.54) (5.79) (4.12) (-4.15) (-3.01) 
Lag Bond BAS 0.098** 0.086* 0.086* 0.007 0.013 0.012 0.111** 0.099 0.004 0.009 0.066 0.061 0.064 0.071* 
  (2.28) (1.79) (1.78) (0.61) (1.18) (1.10) (2.02) (1.64) (0.38) (0.83) (0.91) (0.76) (1.53) (1.66) 
Lag Repo Net Order Flows 3.827*** 3.645*** 3.645*** 0.614*** 0.606*** 0.605*** 3.896*** 3.720*** 0.663*** 0.651*** 3.161*** 2.998*** -0.887 -0.858 
  (6.22) (5.96) (5.98) (4.32) (4.33) (4.32) (5.40) (5.17) (4.57) (4.57) (3.41) (3.21) (-1.11) (-1.08) 
Lag Repo Trades 0.418*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.124*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.523*** 0.517*** 0.113*** 0.122*** 0.310 0.248 0.539*** 0.540*** 
  (3.41) (3.27) (3.27) (5.14) (5.41) (5.53) (3.57) (3.57) (4.61) (5.08) (1.43) (1.15) (3.72) (3.73) 
Lag Repo Volatility 1.544*** 1.015*** 1.015*** 0.942*** 0.878*** 0.875*** 1.572*** 0.966*** 1.199*** 1.106*** 1.619*** 1.149*** 0.461*** 0.439*** 
 
(7.60) (4.17) (4.17) (6.79) (6.23) (6.17) (5.52) (2.64) (5.89) (5.33) (5.73) (3.53) (3.11) (2.89) 
CCP 1.321 0.465 0.462 -0.939 -0.948 -1.188 
        
  (0.79) (0.28) (0.29) (-1.49) (-1.51) (-1.52) 
        
Lag EL -0.122*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.093*** -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.110*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.096*** -0.130*** -0.109*** -0.092*** -0.094*** 
 
(-7.34) (-6.39) (-6.38) (-22.48) (-23.60) (-23.69) (-4.98) (-4.31) (-17.70) (-19.04) (-5.39) (-4.79) (-13.71) (-14.05) 
Lag EL2 0.080** 0.028 0.028 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.032 -0.007 0.084*** 0.086*** 0.120** 0.063 0.080*** 0.081*** 
 
(2.35) (0.85) (0.85) (18.58) (19.57) (19.70) (0.70) (-0.15) (14.33) (15.51) (2.44) (1.33) (11.39) (11.67) 





































        
Seasonal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time-of-Day Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,446 4,446 4,446 6,156 6,156 6,156 1,858 1,858 4,121 4,121 2,588 2,588 2,035 2,035 
Adj. R2 0.430 0.440 0.440 0.549 0.551 0.551 0.432 0.442 0.573 0.577 0.427 0.435 0.523 0.523 
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Table C.2: Counterparty risk for large and small banks – additional regressors in model (5) 
Full repo sample  
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression results over the period January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015. 
Pooled regressions are estimated with HAC robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the GC Hourly Repo 
Spread. Variable definitions and measurements are explained in Table 5. Repo Net Order Flow is measured here in 
billions of euros. EL2 is rescaled over 1,000. Excess Large Bank CDS and Excess Small Bank CDS (measured in basis 
points) are the average difference between the daily volume-weighted average CDS (senior five-year euro-denominated, 
obtained from Bloomberg) of larger and smaller banks (weighted by their relative market capitalisation) and the 
sovereign CDS. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively. Columns 1-7 represent different 
specifications of equation (5). 
 
Full Sample 04/01/2010 – 30/11/2015 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 18.707*** 19.757*** 19.548*** 20.252*** 20.052*** 18.566*** 18.433*** 
 
(8.60) (9.00) (8.76) (9.15) (8.94) (8.63) (8.37) 
Lag Bond Supply 0.157*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
  (5.75) (5.52) (5.51) (5.56) (5.55) (5.64) (5.64) 
Lag Bond BAS 0.046 0.065** 0.066** 0.069** 0.070** 0.056* 0.057* 
  (1.53) (2.06) (2.08) (2.20) (2.22) (1.81) (1.82) 
Lag Repo Net Order Flows 2.110*** 1.972*** 1.979*** 1.978*** 1.987*** 2.006*** 2.009*** 
  (6.34) (6.05) (6.07) (6.08) (6.10) (6.08) (6.09) 
Lag Repo Trades 0.098** 0.095** 0.097** 0.101** 0.103** 0.084** 0.086** 
  (2.31) (2.27) (2.31) (2.43) (2.46) (1.99) (2.02) 
Lag Repo Volatility 1.639*** 1.304*** 1.295*** 1.284*** 1.275*** 1.442*** 1.437*** 
 
(10.37) (7.89) (7.81) (7.75) (7.66) (8.80) (8.73) 
CCP -0.553 -1.353 -1.009 -1.301 -0.976 -1.189 -0.971 
  (-0.51) (-1.25) (-0.88) (-1.21) (-0.88) (-1.09) (-0.77) 
Lag EL -0.141*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.144*** 
  (-17.61) (-17.95) (-17.95) (-17.98) (-17.97) (-17.74) (-17.74) 
Lag EL2 0.139*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
  (15.65) (15.85) (15.83) (15.85) (15.82) (15.85) (15.84) 
Lag Excess Bank CDS 
 
0.072*** 0.077*** 




    
Lag Excess Bank CDS * CCP 
  
-0.009 




    
Lag Excess Large Bank CDS 




   
(8.52) (6.43) 
  
Lag Excess Large Bank CDS * CCP 




    
(-0.86) 
  
Lag Excess Small Bank CDS 
     
0.027*** 0.029*** 
  
     
(6.71) (5.03) 
Lag Excess Small Bank CDS * CCP 
      
-0.002 
 
      
(-0.39) 
Seasonal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time-of-Day Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 10,602 10,602 10,602 10,602 10,602 10,602 10,602 







Table C.3: Counterparty risk for large and small banks – additional regressors in model (5) 
CCP-based repo and the bilateral repo samples  
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression results over the period January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015. 
Pooled regressions are estimated with HAC robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the GC Hourly Repo 
Spread. Variable definitions and measurements are explained in Table 5. Repo Net Order Flow is measured here in 
billions of euros. EL2 is rescaled over 1,000. Excess Large Bank CDS and Excess Small Bank CDS (measured in basis 
points) are the average difference between the daily volume-weighted average CDS (senior five-year euro-denominated, 
obtained from Bloomberg) of larger and smaller banks (weighted by their relative market capitalization) and the 
sovereign CDS. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively. Columns 1-4 represent different 
specifications of equation (5) for the subsample of CCP-based repos, columns 5-8 represent the same specifications but 
on the subsample of bilateral repos. 
Repos CCP-based Bilateral 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 19.835*** 21.090*** 21.602*** 19.866*** 14.001*** 14.834*** 15.493*** 13.390*** 
  (7.65) (8.01) (8.12) (7.71) (8.02) (8.54) (8.86) (7.75) 
Lag Bond Supply 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.234*** 0.212*** 0.210*** 0.224*** 
  (3.72) (3.71) (3.78) (3.73) (10.24) (9.46) (9.38) (9.95) 
Lag Bond BAS 0.054 0.065* 0.070* 0.058 0.024 0.055** 0.058** 0.043* 
  (1.52) (1.81) (1.94) (1.61) (0.96) (2.12) (2.23) (1.70) 
Lag Repo Net Order Flows 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (5.99) (5.71) (5.72) (5.75) (4.10) (3.90) (3.91) (3.95) 
Lag Repo Trades 0.132*** 0.115** 0.121*** 0.106** 0.713*** 0.723*** 0.700*** 0.767*** 
  (2.81) (2.47) (2.63) (2.26) (4.40) (4.50) (4.36) (4.74) 
Lag Repo Volatility 1.698*** 1.440*** 1.413*** 1.563*** 1.651*** 1.225*** 1.219*** 1.380*** 
  (7.55) (6.29) (6.16) (6.83) (15.19) (10.39) (10.37) (11.73) 
Lag EL -0.136*** -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.138*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** 
  (-13.25) (-13.50) (-13.52) (-13.33) (-27.46) (-28.03) (-27.98) (-27.90) 
Lag EL2 0.132*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.131*** 0.138*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.131*** 
  (11.70) (12.02) (12.04) (11.90) (24.72) (23.88) (23.81) (24.49) 
Lag Excess Bank CDS 
 
0.061*** 






   
(13.46) 
  
Lag Excess Large Bank CDS 
  
0.073*** 






   
(13.44) 
 
Lag Excess Small Bank CDS 
   
0.023*** 
   
0.031*** 
  
   
(4.70) 
   
(10.30) 
Seasonal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time-of-Day Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5,979 5,979 5,979 5,979 4,623 4,623 4,623 4,623 




Appendix D. Robustness checks on the results of section 4  
We perform several robustness checks on the main results of Section 4. First, to evaluate the impact 
of the European systemic risk and monetary policy expectations on the repo spread we estimate a 
parsimonious model that uses only the excess liquidity, the squared excess liquidity, a proxy for 
systemic risk in the European financial markets and a proxy for monetary policy expectations as 
explanatory variables (Table D.1, column 1) without including any of the collateral and repo 
factors.25 As a proxy for systemic risk in the European financial markets we use the composite 
indicator of systemic stress (CISS) (see Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca., 2012) on day t-1 which 
aggregates 15 different financial stress measures. We find a positive and significant effect of CISS 
on the repo spread. In times of crisis, higher systemic risk induces repo lenders to charge a higher 
‘premium’. Additionally, we control for expected ECB monetary policy changes (EMPC), i.e. given 
by the difference between the one-month EONIA futures and the EONIA rate on day t-1 (see 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2007). We find a significant negative relation between EMPC and 
repo spread. A negative EMPC means lower expected future rates and signals higher future 
systemic risk at the Eurozone level: this worsens the Italian repo market conditions and leads to 
higher repo spreads. This model reported in Table D.1, column 1, has an adjusted R2 of about 43%. 
Interestingly, we also observe that the CCP dummy is insignificant. This suggests that when we 
account for systemic risk and changes in ECB policy, the risk-mitigating function of the CCP 
becomes of ‘second-order importance’ for the Italian repo spread. Next, in Table D.1, column 2, we 
re-introduce the collateral and repo factors along with EL, CISS and EMPC. As we use EL, we 
exclude bond modified duration given their high correlation. The results for all of the collateral and 
                                                     
25 We also control for the impact on the intraday repo spread of: Italian sovereign five-year CDS, VSTOXX EUR, EURIBOR–OIS 
spread and EONIA volumes. Results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. Finally, we control for the impact of 
economic news on the intraday repo spread, but we do not find such impact. For this control, we apply a methodology similar to 




repo variables remain mostly invariant and consistent with our main regression results in Table 7. 
The model has a higher explanatory power (adjusted R2 of 52.6%). CISS is now only marginally 
significant: this mean that our more parsimonious model (5) without CISS already captures the 
effect of the Eurozone systemic stress. 
Table D.1: Pooled regressions results with alternative combinations of factors for overall 
sample period 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regressions estimated with HAC robust standard errors over the period 
January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015. The dependent variable is the GC Hourly Repo Spread. Variable definitions and 
measurements are explained in Table 5. Repo Net Order Flow is measured here in billions of euros. EL2 is rescaled over 
1,000. CISS is the composite indicator of systemic stress, which aggregates 15 different financial stress measures (Hollo 
et al., 2012). EMPC is the difference between the one-month EONIA futures and the EONIA rate and measures the 
expected monetary policy changes (in basis points). T-statistics are reported in brackets. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and 








































CCP 0.618 -0.961 
  (1.01) (-1.58) 
Lag EL -0.123*** -0.126*** 
  (-34.82) (-39.04) 
Lag EL2 0.106*** 0.123*** 
  (24.73) (32.91) 
Other Controls: 
  
Lag CISS 26.321*** 0.358 
  (14.92) (0.21) 
Lag EMPC -45.289*** -41.909*** 
  (-19.04) (-18.11) 
Seasonal Controls Y Y 
Time-of-day Effects Y Y 
Observations 10,602 10,602 
Adj. R2 0.426 0.526 
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Second, we control whether the impact of the explanatory variables changes over the hours of the 
day. We add to the baseline regression model (5) the interaction terms between each explanatory 
variable and the hourly dummies. In unreported results, we notice that the impact of the collateral 
variables decreases over the first hours of the trading day and then it reaches a stable level after 
11:00 a.m. However, these interaction terms are not statistically significant. 
Third, in Table D.2 we repeat the main regression analysis on repo spreads with hourly Bond 
Supply and Bond BAS constructed from portfolios of bonds used as collateral in the previous day, 
the previous week, the previous two weeks, and the previous two months. The original results of 
Table 7 with hourly Bond Supply and Bond BAS constructed using the collateral information from 
the previous 22 days (one month) are reported in columns (4), (9) and (14) for comparison. Table 
D.2 shows that results do not change.
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Table D.2: Pooled regressions results with bond variables derived from other time windows. 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regressions estimated with HAC robust standard errors over the period January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015 where Bond Supply and 
Bond BAS are derived from time window of 1 day, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month (22 days) and 2 months, respectively. The dependent variable is the GC Hourly Repo Spread. Variable 
definitions and measurements are explained in Table 5. Repo Net Order Flow is measured here in billions of euros. EL2 is rescaled over 1,000. CISS is the composite indicator of 
systemic stress, which aggregates 15 different financial stress measures (Hollo et al., 2012). EMPC is the difference between the one-month EONIA futures and the EONIA rate and 
measures the expected monetary policy changes (in basis points). T-statistics are reported in brackets. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively.  
 All Repos CCP-based Repos Bilateral Repos 
 
  Collateral Weights 
  1 day 1 week 2 weeks 1 month 2 months 1 day 1 week 2 weeks 1 month 2 months 1 day 1 week 2 weeks 1 month 2 months 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Constant 20.000*** 19.457*** 19.036*** 18.707*** 16.836*** 20.283*** 19.826*** 19.358*** 19.835*** 17.113*** 15.385*** 14.501*** 14.075*** 14.001*** 11.707*** 
 
(8.51) (8.39) (8.29) (8.60) (7.51) (6.49) (6.54) (6.55) (7.65) (5.94) (4.35) (4.12) (3.99) (3.81) (3.41) 
Lag Bond Supply 0.132*** 0.142*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.210*** 0.093** 0.100*** 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.156*** 0.211*** 0.226*** 0.238*** 0.234*** 0.307*** 
  (4.21) (4.66) (5.01) (5.75) (6.62) (2.43) (2.74) (3.08) (3.72) (4.24) (3.99) (4.39) (4.52) (4.58) (5.62) 
Lag Bond BAS 0.001 -0.004 0.015 0.046 0.122*** 0.028 0.026 0.041 0.054 0.137** -0.018 -0.023 -0.001 0.024 0.117* 
  (0.02) (-0.09) (0.38) (1.53) (2.85) (0.46) (0.45) (0.76) (1.52) (2.44) (-0.28) (-0.38) (-0.01) (0.41) (1.76) 
Lag Repo Net Order Flows 2.190*** 2.171*** 2.167*** 2.110*** 2.127*** 2.188*** 2.178*** 2.172*** 2.141*** 2.119*** 2.928*** 2.877*** 2.913*** 2.939*** 2.996*** 
  (6.61) (6.55) (6.55) (6.34) (6.60) (6.14) (6.11) (6.11) (5.99) (6.15) (3.59) (3.56) (3.60) (3.60) (3.71) 
Lag Repo Trades 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.098** 0.122*** 0.132*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.795*** 0.813*** 0.819*** 0.713*** 0.822*** 
  (3.01) (2.88) (2.90) (2.31) (3.02) (3.02) (2.91) (2.92) (2.81) (3.02) (4.41) (4.47) (4.50) (3.94) (4.48) 
Lag Repo Volatility 1.830*** 1.859*** 1.790*** 1.639*** 1.428*** 1.834*** 1.854*** 1.798*** 1.698*** 1.472*** 1.815*** 1.847*** 1.765*** 1.651*** 1.364*** 
 
(9.72) (10.45) (9.99) (10.37) (8.08) (6.87) (7.06) (6.91) (7.55) (5.81) (6.86) (7.59) (7.00) (6.86) (5.49) 
CCP -1.179 -1.263 -1.314 -0.553 -1.464                     
  (-1.08) (-1.15) (-1.20) (-0.51) (-1.35)                     
Lag EL -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.146*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.139*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.138*** -0.147*** 
  (-17.73) (-17.73) (-17.72) (-17.61) (-18.21) (-13.31) (-13.25) (-13.25) (-13.25) (-13.60) (-11.37) (-11.36) (-11.34) (-11.09) (-11.72) 
Lag EL2 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.144*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.145*** 
  (15.80) (15.81) (15.81) (15.65) (16.01) (11.67) (11.66) (11.67) (11.70) (11.77) (10.34) (10.35) (10.33) (9.99) (10.54) 
Seasonal Effects  
(excluding day of the week 
effects) 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Day of the week effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time-of-Day Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 10,602 10,602 10,602 10,602 10,602 5,979 5,979 5,979 5,979 5,979 4,623 4,623 4,623 4,623 4,623 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: The MTS GC repo market 
The table reports summary statistics for the daily repo volume (as total notional value of collateral in transacted repo 
contracts measured in millions of euros) used in MTS for ON GC CCP-based and bilateral repo transactions in Panel A, 
and the number of Italian sovereign bonds used as collateral in ON GC repo transactions on MTS according to class of 
bond, maturity group and type of repo in Panel B, over the period from January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015. Panel B 
also reports the total number of Italian sovereign bonds used as collateral in repo transactions recorded on MTS over the 
same period (by maturity group and by repo type). The column “All” indicates all bonds used at least once as repo 
collateral in either CCP-based repo transactions or in bilateral repo transactions (the same bond can be used for both 
types of repos). The classes of bonds issued by the Italian Treasury are: Buoni del Tesoro Pluriennali (BTPs), which are 
fixed coupon-bearing bonds; Buoni del Tesoro Pluriennali indicizzati (BTIs), which are inflation-linked coupon-bearing 
bonds; Buoni Ordinari del Tesoro (BOTs), which are treasury bills; Certificati del Tesoro Zero-Coupon (CTZs), which 
are zero-coupon bonds; and Certificati di Credito del Tesoro (CCTs), which are floating notes. 
Panel A: Transacted volumes (i.e. total notional value) of MTS repo market 
Cash Volumes 
CCP-based Bilateral Repos Total 
(€ millions) (€ millions) (€ millions) 
Daily Average 5,004.29 1,140.76 6,083.53 
Standard 
Deviation 
1,703.30 1,265.59 2,165.68 
Minimum 465.00 5.00 1,484.00 
Maximum 12,254.50 8,270.00 16,816.00 
Trading Days 1,502.00 1,421.00 1,502.00 
Total 7,516,449.00 1,621,013.50 9,137,462.50 
Panel B: Number of bonds used in repo transactions 
Bond Class Maturity Group Sample Bonds used as Repo Collaterals 
BTP 
 
CCP-based Bilateral All 
3 22 21 22 
5 24 23 24 
10 31 31 31 
15 10 10 10 
30 12 12 12 





5 4 4 4 
10 5 5 5 
15 3 3 3 
30 2 2 2 
Total 14 14 14 
BOT 
0.25 16 16 16 
0.5 79 77 79 
1 84 81 84 
Total 179 174 179 
CTZ 2 21 21 21 
CCT 7 22 22 22 




Table 2: Summary statistics of number of repo trades 
The table reports summary statistics on the number of trades for repos within an hour on Italian sovereign bonds over 
the sample period January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015.  
 
Panel A: Statistics on the number of repo trades 
 
Mean  Median  SD Kurtosis  Skewness  Range  Min Max 
All 6.577 4 6.189 6.109 1.601 53 1 54 
CCP-based  9.701 9 6.511 4.938 1.166 53 1 54 
Bilateral 2.536 2 2.015 8.378 1.986 16 1 17 
 
Panel B: Averages and standard deviations for number of repo trades by hourly band 
Time of day Average Standard Deviation 
 
All Repos CCP-based Bilateral All Repos CCP-based Bilateral 
8:00 a.m. – 9:00 a.m. 4.6923 4.8570 1.4074 3.6853 3.6977 0.6593 
9:00 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. 12.8241 15.0327 1.9836 8.3319 7.3729 1.3559 
10:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m. 8.9708 10.1700 1.6883 5.9094 5.5049 1.0839 
11:00 a.m. – 12.00 p.m. 7.5616 8.5953 1.4941 4.8697 4.5036 0.8711 
12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m. 3.6961 5.3658 2.7949 2.8228 3.0821 2.1985 
1:00 p.m. – 2: 00 p.m. 2.4609   2.4609 1.9814   1.9814 
2:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. 2.9548   2.9548 2.3339   2.3339 
3:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. 2.6269   2.6269 1.89   1.89 




Table 3: Summary statistics of hourly repo spreads  
The table reports summary statistics on hourly spread for repos (measured in basis points) on Italian sovereign bonds 
over the sample period January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015. The repo spread is given by the difference between the 
ON GC repo rate and the ECB deposit rate. The hourly repo spread is the volume-weighted average of all intraday repo 
spreads over each hour of the trading day. Panel A shows the general summary statistics for hourly repo spreads; Panel 
B reports the frequency of the repo spread distribution; and Panel C illustrates average repo spreads by hour-band, type 
and subsample. In the bilateral repo segment trading during the morning is thin, so the relative statistics are calculated 
only on a handful of trades. In general, for the CCP segment, the last tradable time is 12:30 p.m. with cut-off time of 
12:45 p.m. for the choice of the collaterals. During the ESDC period there are often no trades in the CCP segment 
during the hourly band 12:00 p.m. –1:00 p.m. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A: Summary statistics for hourly repo spreads (all sample) 
Repo Clearance CCP-based Bilateral All Types 
Mean  16.936 19.746 18.161 
Median  10.025 10.378 10.107 
Standard Deviation  20.053 23.400 21.621 
Kurtosis  10.201 7.486 8.835 
Skewness  2.409 1.976 2.206 
Range  159.016 175.237 175.237 
Minimum  -8.383 -24.000 -24.000 
Maximum 150.633 151.237 151.237 
No. of Collateral Bonds 335 328 335 
No. of Observations 5,980 4,624 10,604 
 
Panel B: Distribution of hourly repo spreads 
Hourly Repo Spread CCP-based Bilateral All Types 
(basis points) No. % No. % No. % 
(-25, 0] 81 1.35% 140 3.03% 221 2.08% 
(0, 25] 4,773 79.82% 3,316 71.71% 8,089 76.28% 
(25, 50] 651 10.89% 630 13.62% 1,281 12.08% 
(50, 75] 322 5.38% 360 7.79% 682 6.43% 
(75, 100] 102 1.71% 121 2.62% 223 2.10% 
> 100 51 0.85% 57 1.23% 108 1.02% 
Total 5,980 100.00% 4,624 100.00% 10,604 100.00% 
 
Panel C: Average hourly repo spreads by hour-band, CCP-based/bilateral segment, and sub-periods 
Time of day Full Sample Period ESDC Period Post-crisis Period 
 
CCP Bil. Diff. CCP - Bil. CCP Bil. Diff. CCP - Bil. CCP Bil. Diff. CCP - Bil. 
8:00 a.m. – 9:00 a.m. 16.45 20.231 -3.783* 31.8 23.162 8.641* 11.56 8.773 2.788 
9:00 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. 17.97 22.822 -4.856*** 30.63 24.912 5.716*** 10.9 11.899 -0.996 
10:00 am – 11:00 a.m. 17.45 23.653 -6.203*** 29.64 25.602 4.040* 10.61 12.937 -2.325 
11:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. 17.09 22.721 -5.633*** 29.39 27.053 2.332 10.38 7.479 2.903** 
12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m. 12.16 21.094 -8.934***   28.477   12.16 10.538 1.623** 
1:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m.   19.837     28.176     11.177   
2:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.   17.694     27.305     10.26   
3:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.   18.27     26.786     9.87   
Total 16.94 19.746 -2.810*** 30.16 27.095 3.062*** 10.97 10.397 0.575**  
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Table 4: Regressions results for model (2) with time-of-day effects 
This table reports the regression results for model (2) of pooled OLS regressions estimated with HAC robust standard 
errors over the period January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015. T-statistics are reported in brackets. *** indicates 1%; ** 
5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: 







   Constant 19.769*** 12.023*** 20.527*** 
  (15.62) (11.41) (13.40) 
8:00 a.m. – 9:00 a.m. 2.389*** 4.311*** -0.728 
  (3.33) (5.43) (-0.24) 
9:00 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. 3.767*** 5.816*** 1.651 
  (5.25) (6.62) (1.21) 
10:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m. 3.428*** 5.287*** 2.010 
  (4.79) (6.06) (1.34) 
11:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. 2.976*** 4.918*** 1.145 
  (4.30) (5.69) (0.81) 
1:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. -0.300 
 
-1.286** 
  (-0.45) 
 
(-2.02) 
2:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. -2.465*** 
 
-3.450*** 
  (-3.80) 
 
(-5.64) 
3:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. -1.897*** 
 
-2.877*** 





  (-4.35) 
  
Seasonal Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,604 5,980 4,624 





Table 5: Summary statistics for explanatory variables 
The table presents the summary statistics for all independent variables over the aggregate repo sample (Panel A) 
and separately for CCP-based repos (Panel B) and bilaterally-traded repos (Period C) over the period that goes 
from January 4, 2010 to November, 30 2015. Bond Supply is measured by the portfolio-weighted hourly 
average of the sum of outstanding notional of bonds available for purchase at the top three levels of the ask-side 
(the measurement unit is millions of euros). Bond BAS is the portfolio-weighted hourly average bond bid-ask 
spread (measured in basis points). Bond Mod. Duration is measured by the portfolio-weighted hourly average 
bond modified duration. Repo Net Order Flow is equal to the hourly difference between GC repo volume and 
GC reverse repo volumes (measured in millions of euros). Repo Trades is the total number of hourly repo 
transactions. Repo Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of repo rates for each hour over a rolling 
window of 22 days. EL is the total excess liquidity deposited daily at the ECB facility and it is computed as the 
credit institutions’ current account holdings, plus funds in the ECB deposit facility minus reserve requirements 
(the measurement unit is billions of euros). Margin Costs (measured in percentage) is the initial margin required 
by the Italian central counterparties for the Italian sovereign bonds for a duration ranging from 3.25 to 4.75 
years. The Excess Bank CDS (measured in basis points) is the average difference between banks’ daily (senior 
five-year euro-denominated) CDS premium and the five-year euro-denominated Italian CDS premium obtained 
from Bloomberg. The average measure is weighted by the market capitalisation of the Italian banks. 
Panel A: All Repos 
Variables Obs. Mean  Median  SD Kurtosis  Skewness  Range  Min Max 
Bond Supply (€ M) 10,604 47.720 46.946 15.917 2.358 0.086 98.924 1.281 100.205 
Bond BAS 10,604 26.093 15.082 28.222 13.836 2.854 259.046 0.110 259.156 
Bond Mod. Duration 10,604 3.979 4.073 0.770 2.844 -0.277 5.713 0.161 5.874 
Repo Net Order Flow (€ M) 10,604 -140.300 -66.000 747.979 7.366 -0.461 10,442.500 -4,730.500 5,712.000 
Repo Trades  10,604 6.577 4.000 6.189 6.109 1.601 53.000 1.000 54.000 
Repo Volatility  10,604 5.495 4.212 4.628 14.806 2.976 36.535 0.903 37.438 
EL (€ B) 10,604 270.085 198.395 228.730 2.870 0.960 909.432 -96.221 813.211 
          
Panel B: CCP-based Repos 
Variables Obs. Mean  Median  SD Kurtosis  Skewness  Range  Min Max 
Bond Supply (€ M) 5,980 47.998 48.195 16.989 2.178 -0.037 98.924 1.281 100.205 
Bond BAS 5,980 27.047 14.889 28.941 11.618 2.597 226.098 0.139 226.237 
Bond Mod. Duration 5,980 3.938 4.055 0.611 3.123 -0.216 5.346 0.161 5.507 
Repo Net Order Flow (€ M) 5,980 -183.755 -125.000 924.350 5.238 -0.253 10,442.500 -4,730.500 5,712.000 
Repo Trades  5,980 9.701 9.000 6.511 4.938 1.166 53.000 1.000 54.000 
Repo Volatility  5,980 4.889 3.616 4.106 15.736 3.105 29.920 0.903 30.823 
EL (€ B) 5,980 285.173 209.743 226.685 2.688 0.885 909.432 -96.221 813.211 
          
Panel C: Bilateral Repos 
Variables Obs. Mean  Median  SD Kurtosis  Skewness  Range  Min Max 
Bond Supply (€ M) 4,624 47.361 45.875 14.407 2.641 0.316 92.061 3.078 95.139 
Bond BAS 4,624 24.858 15.238 27.219 17.477 3.242 259.046 0.110 259.156 
Bond Mod. Duration 4,624 4.032 4.139 0.934 2.323 -0.375 5.708 0.166 5.874 
Repo Net Order Flow (€ M) 4,624 -84.102 -50.000 415.364 10.018 -0.977 5,806.000 -3,341.000 2,465.000 
Repo Trades  4,624 2.536 2.000 2.015 8.378 1.986 16.000 1.000 17.000 
Repo Volatility  4,624 6.278 4.917 5.122 13.288 2.802 36.313 1.125 37.438 
EL (€ B) 4,624 250.572 185.172 229.908 3.166 1.078 909.432 -96.221 813.211 
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Table 6: Pearson correlation matrixes for the aggregate sample, the CCP-based repo and the 
bilateral repo samples 
Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables for the aggregate repo sample (Panel A) and separately for 
CCP-based repos (Panel B) and bilaterally traded repos (Panel C) over the period that goes from January 4, 2010 to 
November 30, 2015. Variable definitions and measurements are explained in Table 5. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 
10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A: All Repos 
Variable 
GC Hourly Bond Bond Bond Repo Repo Repo 
EL 
Margin 
Repo Spread Supply BAS Mod. Duration Net Order Flow Trades Volatility Costs 
Bond Supply 0.022** 
        
Bond BAS 0.176*** -0.592*** 
       
Bond Mod. Duration 0.203*** -0.077*** 0.077*** 
      
Repo Net Order Flow 0.068*** 0.075*** -0.026*** -0.046*** 
     
Repo Trades  0.029*** 0.231*** -0.081*** -0.010 -0.122*** 
    
Repo Volatility  0.441*** -0.223*** 0.627*** 0.097*** -0.005 -0.071*** 
   
EL -0.464*** -0.11*** 0.115*** -0.59*** 0.046*** -0.026** -0.213*** 
  
Margin Costs -0.213*** 0.161*** 0.09*** -0.722*** 0.059*** 0.152*** 0.052*** 0.557*** 
 
Excess Bank CDS 0.014 -0.061*** 0.196*** -0.562*** 0.06*** 0.008 0.192*** 0.533*** 0.661*** 
Panel B: CCP-based Repos 
Variable 
GC Hourly Bond Bond Bond Repo Repo Repo 
EL 
Margin 
Repo Spread Supply BAS Mod. Duration Net Order Flow Trades Volatility Costs 
Bond Supply -0.049*** 
        
Bond BAS 0.197*** -0.633*** 
       
Bond Mod. Duration 0.098*** 0.068*** -0.044*** 
      
Repo Net Order Flow 0.078*** 0.082*** -0.025* -0.038*** 
     
Repo Trades  0.066*** 0.366*** -0.178*** -0.042*** -0.086*** 
    
Repo Volatility  0.481*** -0.241*** 0.599*** -0.020 -0.020 0.003 
   
EL -0.471*** -0.109*** 0.147*** -0.527*** 0.043*** -0.062*** -0.228*** 
  
Margin Costs -0.231*** 0.153*** 0.067*** -0.713*** 0.065*** 0.163*** 0.001 0.503*** 
 
Excess Bank CDS -0.018 -0.123*** 0.222*** -0.65*** 0.063*** -0.014 0.158*** 0.537*** 0.636*** 
Panel C: Bilateral Repos 
Variable 
Hourly Bond Bond Bond Repo Repo Repo 
EL 
Margin 
Repo Spread Supply BAS Mod. Duration Net Order Flow Trades Volatility Costs 
Bond Supply 0.118*** 
        
Bond BAS 0.16*** -0.53*** 
       
Bond Mod. Duration 0.277*** -0.227*** 0.195*** 
      
Repo Net Order Flow 0.053*** 0.067*** -0.025* -0.098*** 
     
Repo Trades  0.196*** -0.093*** 0.04*** 0.259*** -0.267*** 
    
Repo Volatility  0.398*** -0.21*** 0.701*** 0.164*** -0.011 0.081*** 
   
EL -0.453*** -0.118*** 0.067*** -0.661*** 0.086*** -0.226*** -0.184*** 
  
Margin Costs -0.18*** 0.175*** 0.106*** -0.745*** 0.115*** -0.283*** 0.155*** 0.614*** 
 
Excess Bank CDS 0.055*** 0.026* 0.158*** -0.507*** 0.083*** -0.101*** 0.248*** 0.525*** 0.695*** 
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Table 7: Collateral and repo factors – Pooled regressions results for model (5) 
This table reports the regression results for model (5) of pooled OLS regressions estimated with HAC robust standard errors over the period January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015. The 
dependent variable is the GC Hourly Repo Spread. Variable definitions and measurements are explained at Table 5. Repo Net Order Flow is measured here in billions of euros. EL2 is rescaled 
over 1,000. T-statistics are reported in brackets. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged by one hour. 
 
All Repos CCP-based Repos Bilateral Repos 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant -24.833*** -6.857*** -26.121*** 18.707*** -17.376*** -10.917*** -22.067*** 19.835*** -41.524*** -8.586*** -39.264*** 14.001*** 
 
(-9.14) (-3.32) (-10.76) (8.60) (-4.19) (-3.20) (-6.58) (7.65) (-9.87) (-3.20) (-10.13) (3.81) 
Lag Bond Supply 0.323***   0.232*** 0.157*** 0.181***   0.123*** 0.106*** 0.544***   0.439*** 0.234*** 
  (8.65)   (7.89) (5.75) (4.07)   (3.75) (3.72) (8.96)   (8.65) (4.58) 
Lag Bond BAS 0.218*** 0.132***   0.046 0.189*** 0.147***   0.054 0.239*** 0.097**   0.024 
  (7.27) (4.85)   (1.53) (4.81) (4.26)   (1.52) (5.18) (2.11)   (0.41) 
Lag Bond Mod. Duration 5.366*** 5.210*** 4.781***   3.673*** 4.153*** 3.845***   7.274*** 5.586*** 5.792***   
  (9.28) (8.65) (9.47)   (4.32) (4.96) (5.65)   (9.21) (6.64) (8.23)   
Lag Repo Net Order Flows   2.396*** 2.097*** 2.110***   2.167*** 2.124*** 2.141***   5.341*** 4.245*** 2.939*** 
    (5.57) (5.31) (6.34)   (4.62) (4.98) (5.99)   (4.96) (4.58) (3.60) 
Lag Repo Trades   0.428*** 0.144*** 0.098**   0.350*** 0.161*** 0.132***   1.737*** 1.600*** 0.713*** 
    (7.58) (2.80) (2.31)   (5.79) (2.77) (2.81)   (7.19) (7.36) (3.94) 
Lag Repo Volatility     2.138*** 1.639***     2.445*** 1.698***     1.839*** 1.651*** 
 
    (12.01) (10.37)     (9.29) (7.55)     (8.36) (6.86) 
CCP -5.803*** -6.993*** -3.314** -0.553                 
  (-4.43) (-4.82) (-2.56) (-0.51)                 
Lag EL       -0.141***       -0.136***       -0.138*** 
        (-17.61)       (-13.25)       (-11.09) 
Lag EL2       0.139***       0.132***       0.138*** 
        (15.65)       (11.70)       (9.99) 
8:00 a.m. – 9:00 a.m. 4.227*** 3.960*** 3.373*** 2.325*** 5.892*** 5.726*** 4.173*** 2.238*** -0.159 -4.796 -1.307 1.282 
  (6.04) (5.48) (5.50) (4.17) (6.94) (7.17) (5.54) (4.14) (-0.06) (-1.59) (-0.55) (0.60) 
9:00 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. 6.008*** 2.329*** 7.761*** 4.165*** 5.905*** 3.821*** 7.009*** 3.387*** 1.180 -2.975** 0.242 0.949 
  (6.42) (2.72) (9.41) (6.15) (4.27) (3.10) (5.94) (4.24) (0.91) (-2.17) (0.20) (0.86) 
10:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m. 3.193*** 0.286 2.840*** 1.328** 4.890*** 2.368** 2.780*** 0.659 -0.159 -2.715* 1.515 1.529 
  (4.47) (0.34) (3.81) (2.18) (5.05) (2.01) (2.80) (1.02) (-0.11) (-1.78) (1.06) (1.26) 
11:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. 3.294*** 1.904*** 2.019*** 0.781 5.316*** 4.032*** 2.534*** 0.539 -2.382* -2.762** -1.639 -0.139 
  (4.91) (2.74) (3.32) (1.59) (5.80) (4.31) (3.09) (1.07) (-1.75) (-2.01) (-1.31) (-0.13) 
1:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. 1.037* 0.683 0.589 -0.083         -1.283* -1.376** -2.168*** -0.826 
  (1.65) (1.07) (1.01) (-0.16)         (-1.94) (-1.98) (-3.29) (-1.52) 
2:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. -0.026 -0.334 -0.230 -0.187         -2.125*** -2.061*** -2.637*** -0.890* 
  (-0.04) (-0.55) (-0.42) (-0.38)         (-3.47) (-3.22) (-4.49) (-1.81) 
3:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. 0.286 -0.528 -0.274 -0.443         -1.731*** -3.083*** -3.375*** -1.388** 
  (0.46) (-0.81) (-0.47) (-0.84)         (-2.71) (-4.13) (-4.89) (-2.42) 
Seasonal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 10,602 10,602 10,602 10,602 5,979 5,979 5,979 5,979 4,623 4,623 4,623 4,623 
Adj. R2 0.132 0.114 0.280 0.476 0.0872 0.0936 0.287 0.500 0.205 0.149 0.325 0.457 
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Table 8: Collateral and repo factors – Pooled regression results for model (5) over two sub-periods 
This table reports the regression results for model (5) of pooled OLS regression results over two sub-periods. European sovereign debt crisis (ESDC) sub-period: January 4, 2010 to 
February 10, 2012. Post-crisis period: February 11, 2012 to November 30, 2015. Pooled regressions are estimated with HAC robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the GC 
Hourly Repo Spread. Variable definitions and measurements are explained in Table 5. Repo Net Order Flow is measured here in billions of euros. EL2 is rescaled over 1,000. T-
statistics are reported in brackets. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged by one hour. 
  All Repos CCP-based Repos Bilateral Repos 
Period ESDC Post-Crisis ESDC Post-Crisis ESDC Post-Crisis 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Constant 4.064 -0.082 28.135*** 27.928*** 6.540* 1.797 25.919*** 25.733*** 2.882 0.071 29.966*** 28.908*** 
 
(1.26) (-0.02) (19.07) (18.83) (1.67) (0.41) (13.71) (13.16) (0.61) (0.01) (15.68) (14.22) 
Lag Bond Supply 0.452*** 0.545*** -0.069*** -0.066*** 0.408*** 0.534*** -0.058*** -0.055*** 0.496*** 0.552*** -0.087*** -0.075*** 
  (8.48) (8.58) (-4.93) (-4.61) (5.68) (6.44) (-2.91) (-2.65) (6.46) (5.79) (-4.79) (-4.15) 
Lag Bond BAS   0.098**   0.007   0.111**   0.004   0.066   0.064 
    (2.28)   (0.61)   (2.02)   (0.38)   (0.91)   (1.53) 
Lag Repo Net Order Flows 3.953*** 3.827*** 0.612*** 0.614*** 4.083*** 3.896*** 0.662*** 0.663*** 3.108*** 3.161*** -0.923 -0.887 
  (6.25) (6.22) (4.32) (4.32) (5.43) (5.40) (4.57) (4.57) (3.35) (3.41) (-1.17) (-1.11) 
Lag Repo Trades 0.426*** 0.418*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.540*** 0.523*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.275 0.310 0.537*** 0.539*** 
  (3.46) (3.41) (5.08) (5.14) (3.60) (3.57) (4.60) (4.61) (1.28) (1.43) (3.72) (3.72) 
Lag Repo Volatility 1.903*** 1.544*** 0.945*** 0.942*** 2.052*** 1.572*** 1.200*** 1.199*** 1.840*** 1.619*** 0.501*** 0.461*** 
 
(11.83) (7.60) (6.84) (6.79) (9.16) (5.52) (5.91) (5.89) (8.67) (5.73) (3.34) (3.11) 
CCP 1.621 1.321 -0.896 -0.939                 
 
(0.96) (0.79) (-1.46) (-1.49)                 
Lag EL -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.105*** -0.110*** -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.093*** -0.092*** 
 
(-7.24) (-7.34) (-22.51) (-22.48) (-4.65) (-4.98) (-17.72) (-17.70) (-5.49) (-5.39) (-13.80) (-13.71) 
Lag EL2 0.086** 0.080** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.026 0.032 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.129*** 0.120** 0.083*** 0.080*** 
 
(2.55) (2.35) (18.61) (18.58) (0.55) (0.70) (14.33) (14.33) (2.78) (2.44) (11.75) (11.39) 
Seasonal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time-of-Day Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,446 4,446 6,156 6,156 1,858 1,858 4,121 4,121 2,588 2,588 2,035 2,035 







Table 9: Regulatory changes and CCP costs – pooled regression results for model (5) over two sub-periods 
This table reports the regression results for model (5) of pooled OLS regression results over two sub-periods. European sovereign debt crisis (ESDC) sub-period: January 4, 2010 to 
February 10, 2012. Post-crisis period: February 11, 2012 to November 30, 2015. Pooled regressions are estimated with HAC robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the GC 
Hourly Repo Spread. Variable definitions and measurements are explained in Table 5. Repo Net Order Flow is measured here in billions of euros. EL2 is rescaled over 1,000. T-
statistics are reported in brackets. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged by one hour. 
 All Repos CCP-based Repos Bilateral Repos 
Period ESDC Post-Crisis ESDC Post-Crisis ESDC Post-Crisis 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Constant -0.082 1.563 2.352 27.928*** 27.044*** 27.374*** 1.797 3.368 25.733*** 25.722*** 0.071 1.270 28.908*** 28.173*** 
 
(-0.02) (0.45) (0.61) (18.83) (13.41) (12.48) (0.41) (0.82) (13.16) (10.06) (0.01) (0.24) (14.22) (10.78) 
Lag Bond Supply 0.545*** 0.386*** 0.383*** -0.066*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 0.534*** 0.346*** -0.055*** -0.055** 0.552*** 0.421*** -0.075*** -0.072*** 
  (8.58) (5.87) (5.82) (-4.61) (-3.78) (-3.80) (6.44) (4.16) (-2.65) (-2.41) (5.79) (4.36) (-4.15) (-3.52) 
Lag Bond BAS 0.098** -0.011 -0.014 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.111** -0.022 0.004 0.004 0.066 -0.016 0.064 0.067 
  (2.28) (-0.29) (-0.38) (0.61) (0.82) (0.79) (2.02) (-0.45) (0.38) (0.39) (0.91) (-0.28) (1.53) (1.56) 
Lag Repo Net Order Flows 3.827*** 3.393*** 3.361*** 0.614*** 0.610*** 0.610*** 3.896*** 3.406*** 0.663*** 0.662*** 3.161*** 2.946*** -0.887 -0.891 
  (6.22) (5.69) (5.71) (4.32) (4.30) (4.30) (5.40) (4.92) (4.57) (4.55) (3.41) (3.13) (-1.11) (-1.12) 
Lag Repo Trades 0.418*** 0.332*** 0.310*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.523*** 0.373*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.310 0.304 0.539*** 0.536*** 
  (3.41) (2.76) (2.61) (5.14) (5.20) (5.17) (3.57) (2.61) (4.61) (4.68) (1.43) (1.39) (3.72) (3.72) 
Lag Repo Volatility 1.544*** 0.805*** 0.816*** 0.942*** 0.915*** 0.913*** 1.572*** 0.861** 1.199*** 1.199*** 1.619*** 0.914** 0.461*** 0.451*** 
 
(7.60) (2.86) (2.89) (6.79) (6.57) (6.54) (5.52) (2.36) (5.89) (5.59) (5.73) (2.03) (3.11) (3.01) 
CCP 1.321 0.849 -0.440 -0.939 -0.936 -1.355 
        
  (0.79) (0.51) (-0.15) (-1.49) (-1.49) (-0.78) 
        
Lag EL -0.122*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.110*** -0.103*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.130*** -0.118*** -0.092*** -0.092*** 
 
(-7.34) (-6.62) (-6.61) (-22.48) (-22.39) (-22.39) (-4.98) (-4.68) (-17.70) (-17.61) (-5.39) (-4.63) (-13.71) (-13.59) 
Lag EL2 0.080** -0.007 -0.007 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.032 -0.046 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.120** 0.030 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 






































        
Seasonal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time-of-Day Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,446 4,446 4,446 6,156 6,156 6,156 1,858 1,858 4,121 4,121 2,588 2,588 2,035 2,035 
Adj. R2 0.430 0.449 0.449 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.432 0.458 0.573 0.573 0.427 0.440 0.523 0.523 
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Table 10: Collateral selection – logit regression results for model (6)  
This table reports the regression results of model (6) estimated with as a Logit model with HC robust standard errors and bond fixed effects. Outstanding Amount = daily total outstanding notional 
amount of each bond (measured in billions of euros). Bond BAS = daily time-weighted average bond’s bid-ask spread (measured in basis points). Bond Mod. Duration = daily average bond’s modified 
duration (measured in years). Specialness = difference between the daily GC tomorrow next repo rate and the special tomorrow next repo rates of the bond (measured in basis points). Margin Costs 
(measured in percentage) = initial margin required by CC&G and LCH.Clearnet for the Italian sovereign bonds. Marginal effects are reported in percentage and in italics. T-statistics are reported in 
brackets. *** indicates 1%; ** 5%; and * 10% significance level, respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged by one hour. 
 
All Repos CCP-based Repos Bilateral Repos 
Period 
Full Sample Full Sample ESDC Post-Crisis Full Sample 







04/01/2010 – 10/02/2012 11/02/2012 – 30/11/2015 
04/01/2010 – 
30/11/2015 
04/01/2010 – 10/02/2012 11/02/2012 – 30/11/2015 
Dep.Var.: Prob of Selection (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Ind. Variables: 
           
Constant -1.1047*** -0.2013** 3.2655*** -0.2342** -2.0505*** -1.5105*** -7.0863*** -2.4134*** -1.3113*** -5.6394*** -3.8536*** 
 
(0.0945) (0.0918) (0.2458) (0.1156) (0.1300) (0.0984) (0.1387) (0.2504) (0.1287) (0.2659) (0.2143) 
Lag Outstanding Amount 0.0244*** 0.0264*** 0.0227*** 0.0470*** 0.0634*** 0.0606*** -0.0257*** 0.0145** 0.0049 0.0060 -0.0087 
 
(0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0072) (0.0071) 
 
0.5216 0.6169 0.54489 1.12941 1.45231 1.387 -0.2880 0.32747 0.11042 0.03599 -0.05257 
Lag Bond BAS 0.0019*** 0.0006*** -0.0013*** 0.0005** -0.0005 0.0001 0.0051*** -0.0007** -0.0022*** 0.0033*** 0.0041*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
 
0.0402 0.0150 -0.03003 0.01301 -0.01105 0.00179 0.0571 -0.01479 -0.05069 0.01943 0.02449 











































Lag Specialness -0.0073*** -0.0072*** -0.0064*** -0.0060*** -0.0088*** -0.0088*** -0.0059*** -0.0075*** -0.0075*** -0.0013 -0.0016 
 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
 
-0.1566 -0.1674 -0.1536 -0.14505 -0.20055 -0.20223 -0.0659 -0.16848 -0.17006 -0.00755 -0.00936 
Margin Costs 
























Seasonal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bond Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 151,299 151,299 51,798 51,798 99,501 99,501 151,299 51,798 51,798 99,501 99,501 
Observations (DV = 1) 102,234 93,480 30,696 30,696 62,784 62,784 26,013 18,392 18,392 7,621 7,621 
Pseudo R2 0.0615 0.0566 0.0691 0.0650 0.0686 0.0682 0.141 0.0520 0.0511 0.0605 0.0576 
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Figure 1: GC repos 
This figure shows the volume-weighted average repo rates (measured in basis points) for Italian ON GC CCP-
based repos and bilateral repos versus the ECB deposit rate, the ECB main refinancing operations (MRO) rate 
and the ECB lending rate in Panel A, and total daily trading volumes (measured in billions of euros) of ON GC 
CCP-based and bilaterally-traded repos on Italian sovereign bonds in Panel B, over the period from January 4, 
2010 to November 30, 2015. 
Panel A: CCP ON GC Italian repo rate, bilateral ON GC Italian repo rate and ECB deposit and 
lending rates 
 




Figure 2: Intraday trading volumes of ON GC Italian repos by hourly band 
This figure shows the total intraday trading volumes (measured in billions of euros) by hourly band of overnight 
general collateral repos on Italian sovereign bonds. The sample period goes from January 4, 2010 to November 
30, 2015. The trading day ends at 12:30 p.m. CET for CCP-based repos and at 3:30 p.m. CET for bilaterally 
traded repos. The cut-off times for the choice of collateral are 12:45 p.m. CET for CCP-based repos and 3:45 
p.m. CET for bilaterally-traded repos. Total intraday trading volumes of overnight general collateral repos on 
Italian sovereign bonds (measured in billions of euros) are calculated by hourly band over the period from 
January 4, 2010 to November 30, 2015.  
 
Figure 3: Collateral bond supply and outstanding amount 
This figure shows the daily average of Bond Supply (measured in € millions) versus the total outstanding 
amount of all Italian sovereign bonds (measured in € millions), for bonds used in CCP and bilateral repos over 




Figure 4: Estimated patterns of hourly CCP and bilateral repo spread over two sub-
periods  
The figure shows the estimated pattern of hourly repo spreads (measured in basis points) in Panel A for CCP-
based repos and in Panel B for bilaterally traded repos over the two sub-periods with 95% confidence bounds. 
The model estimated in both Panel A and B is model (5), and the main results are reported in Table 8. The 
independent variables are assumed at their sample mean values.  
Panel A: CCP-based Repos 
 
Panel B: Bilateral Repos 
 
